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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Marshall was a historian as well as a jurist.  In 1804, in the 
introductory volume of his five-volume series entitled The Life of 
George Washington, Marshall sought to place Washington’s life in con-
text by presenting a lengthy narrative “of the principal events 
preceding our revolutionary war.”1  Almost twenty years later, when 
crafting the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Johnson v. 
McIntosh,2 Marshall relied heavily on his history of America “from its 
discovery to the present day” in order to proclaim “the universal rec-
ognition” of two legal principles: (1) that European discovery of lands 
in America “gave exclusive title to those who made it”; and (2) that 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.  J.D. 1981, Duke Univer-
sity School of Law; B.A. 1978, Vanderbilt University.  Research for this Article was 
supported by the University of Dayton School of Law through a summer research 
grant. 
 1 1 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON xi (1804). 
 2 Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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such discovery necessarily diminished the power of Indian nations “to 
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”3
While the writings of theorists and the practices of colonizing 
nations lend support for Marshall’s conclusions, the Chief Justice’s 
claim of “universal recognition” of the principles underlying Johnson v. 
McIntosh is belied by the historical record.4  The Illinois and Wabash 
purchases at issue in Johnson v. McIntosh, whereby native lands were 
sold in 1773 and 1775 to private individuals, were by no means un-
precedented.5  This Article presents a historical rejoinder to John 
Marshall’s claim of universal acceptance of the doctrine of discovery 
and the diminished nature of Indian land rights.  Part II of this Arti-
cle sets the stage with a brief description of Johnson v. McIntosh. 
Part III demonstrates that Indians were viewed as early as the 
1630s as the absolute and “true owners”6 of America, and as such 
were empowered to retain or transfer title to their lands as they saw 
fit.  The founder of Rhode Island, Roger Williams, is a case in point.  
Within six years after arriving in America, Williams found himself 
banished from the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and a 
grantee—by virtue of a private transaction with the Narragansett In-
dians—of lands in present-day Providence.7  In this brief period of 
time, Williams not only established “a rapport with and understand-
ing of the native Americans unmatched by any of his countrymen in 
the New World,”8 but also formulated the simple, yet profoundly 
radical, view that Europeans could “justly occupy lands in the Ameri-
cas only by purchasing those lands from their rightful owners, the 
Indians.”9
Williams’ view, of course, was unacceptable to the colonizing na-
tions.10  However, as surveyed in Part IV of this Article, European 
views of Indian land rights during “the age of discovery” were by no 
means as uniform as Marshall intimates in Johnson v. McIntosh.11  The 
Spanish, French, Dutch, Swedish, and English views of Indian land 
 3 Id. at 574. 
 4 See infra Part II. 
 5 See infra Part II. 
 6 JAMES ERNST, ROGER WILLIAMS: NEW ENGLAND FIREBRAND 100 (AMS Press 1969) 
(1932). 
 7 EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN AMERICA 48–49 
(1991). 
 8 Id. at 28. 
 9 WILLIAM CHRISTIE MACLEOD, THE AMERICAN INDIAN FRONTIER 199 (1928). 
 10 See infra notes 80–114, and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
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rights varied considerably in their emphasis on discovery, papal au-
thority, royal grant, feudal right, possession, and purchase. 
Finally, Part V examines a lesser known conflict over Indian land 
rights: the dispute between the “Newark purchasers,” who relied on 
Indian deeds obtained in the seventeenth century, and the Proprie-
tors of New Jersey, who sought to collect the feudal quit-rents due 
them under their royal grants.  This controversy is of historical im-
portance as it foreshadowed the struggle of the Illinois and Wabash 
Land Company in Johnson v. McIntosh to overcome government resis-
tance to its title claims.  In both instances, ownership of land was 
contested on the basis of competing chains of title.  In each of the re-
spective cases, native land rights were championed not by the Indians 
themselves, but by the recipients of Indian deeds.12  And in both in-
stances, natural rights to property were opposed by the doctrine of 
discovery, feudal law, statutory prohibitions, and royal authority.13
II. JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH 
Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, an 1823 United States 
Supreme Court decision authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, was 
“an action of ejectment for lands in the State and District of Illinois, 
claimed by the plaintiffs under a purchase and conveyance from the 
Piankeshaw Indians, and by the defendant, under a grant from the 
United States.”14  On October 18, 1775, in Vincennes, Indiana, eleven 
Piankeshaw chiefs “for good and valuable consideration” deeded an 
immense tract of land to Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Vir-
ginia, his son, and eighteen other persons from Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Great Britain, and the Illinois Country.15  However, on 
December 30, 1805, the Piankeshaw ceded much of the same land to 
the United States in a treaty negotiated by William Henry Harrison, 
governor of the Indiana Territory.16  Thereafter, Vincennes resident 
William McIntosh—according to the jointly submitted statement of 
the case—purchased a portion of the land in question from the fed-
eral government, thus setting up a conflict in title.17
The plaintiffs, who were the heirs of Thomas Johnson, one of 
the twenty original purchasers, appeared to have the upper hand.  Af-
ter all, if the Piankeshaw Tribe sold the property in 1775, the Tribe 
 12 See infra Part V. 
 13 See infra Part V. 
 14 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543 (1823). 
 15 Id. at 555. 
 16 7 Stat. 100 (1805). 
 17 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 560. 
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had nothing left to cede to the United States in 1805, and therefore 
the government had nothing to sell to William McIntosh: nemo dat qui 
non habet (he who hath not cannot give).18  Faced with these facts, the 
attorneys representing the defendant McIntosh were compelled to 
argue that the 1775 purchase was invalid on the ground that Indian 
tribes lacked the legal capacity to sell land to private individuals.19  
Hence, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, the issue to be decided in 
Johnson v. McIntosh was “the power of Indians to give, and of private 
individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of 
this country.”20
On behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, Marshall announced 
that, following “the discovery of this immense continent,”21 Indians in 
America no longer enjoyed the “power to dispose of the soil, at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased”22 and that, consequently, “the 
plaintiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts 
of the United States.”23  The decision in Johnson v. McIntosh was a 
crushing defeat for the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, which in 
1779 had united the investors in the Piankeshaw (or Wabash) pur-
chase with an overlapping group of individuals who had acquired a 
similarly large tract of land in 1773 from the Illinois Indians.24  The 
quixotic pursuit of fortune by the speculators in the Illinois-Wabash 
purchase, sustained for a half century, ended in complete and un-
equivocal failure. 
The Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians did not participate in the 
Johnson v. McIntosh litigation, and, consequently, “no Indian voices 
were heard in a case which had, and continues to have, profound ef-
fects on Indian property rights.”25  Indeed, Wilcomb Washburn views 
Marshall’s opinion as “the basis of all subsequent determinations of 
Indian right,”26 and Kenneth Bobroff describes Johnson v. McIntosh as 
“one of the foundational Indian law cases” that “is at the root of title 
 18 Id. at 571. 
 19 Id. at 572. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 574. 
 23 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604–05. 
 24 Id. at 572. 
 25 Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters’ Last Stand: 
American Indian Women’s Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property 
Rights, 77 N.C. L. REV. 637, 645 (1999). 
 26 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND, WHITE MAN’S LAW 66 (2d ed. 1995). 
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for most real property in the United States.”27  Although the decision 
has been described as “a brilliant compromise,”28 “pos[ing] little or 
no restrictions on the tribes,”29 “not . . . purely inimical to tribal in-
terests,”30 and even as “one of the most pro-Indian decisions to come 
from the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century,”31 the majority of 
commentators have severely criticized Johnson v. McIntosh and its en-
dorsement of the doctrines of discovery and conquest.32
Robert Williams, Jr., concludes that “[f]or Marshall, the Doc-
trine of Discovery presented itself as a convenient fiction, one which 
masked the Revolutionary era political struggle by which Indian Na-
tions were denied rights and status in their lands,”33 and contends 
that “Indian people regard the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’ . . . as the 
‘separate but equal’34 and Korematsu35 of United States race-oriented 
jurisprudence respecting their status and rights.”36  David Wilkins as-
serts that “[t]he thrust of the Court’s message in M’Intosh was that 
indigenous peoples did not have the natural right exercised by ‘civi-
 27 Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and Beyond, 37 
TULSA L.J. 521, 521 (2001). 
 28 Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 
HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1223 (1980). 
 29 Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 24 
(1987). 
 30 Kevin J. Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal 
Thought on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1384 (1991) (book 
review). 
 31 June Carbone, Back to the Future: Intellectual Property and the Rediscovery of Property 
Rights—and Wrongs, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 633 (2002). 
 32 See infra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 33 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 
ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 191 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Jr., American Indian Lands]. 
 34 In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the United States Supreme Court up-
held against Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges a Louisiana statute 
requiring railroads to provide “equal but separate” accommodations for white and 
black passengers.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “enforced separa-
tion of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.”  Id. at 551. 
 35 In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944), the United States 
Supreme Court held that it was within the war powers of Congress and the Executive 
branch to temporarily exclude Japanese-Americans from the West Coast during 
World War II. 
 36 Williams, Jr., American Indian Lands, supra note 33, at 169.  See also ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF 
CONQUEST 317 (1990) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT] (“Johnson’s acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into United 
States law preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and colonialism 
directed against non-Western peoples. . . . The Doctrine of Discovery’s underlying 
medievally derived ideology—that normatively divergent ‘savage’ peoples could be 
denied rights and status equal to those accorded to the civilized nations of Europe—
had become an integral part of the fabric of United States federal Indian law.”). 
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lized’ nations to sell their property to whomever they wished,”37 and 
that the doctrine of discovery, “when defined . . . to mean that the 
federal government holds the fee-simple title to all the Indian lands 
in the United States, is a clear legal fiction that needs to be explicitly 
stricken from the federal government’s political and legal vocabu-
lary.”38  Steven Newcomb posits that “Johnson was premised on the 
ancient principle of Christian dominion and a distinction between 
paramount rights of ‘Christian people’ and subordinate rights of 
‘heathens’ or non-Christians.”39  Others have described the 1823 Su-
preme Court decision as “conquest by judicial fiat,”40 “a tortured 
rationale,”41 “a tool of efficient expropriation of Indian lands,”42 “cor-
rupt,”43 “having both racist and colonial roots,”44 and “an extra-
constitutional fiction . . . developed . . . to rationalize the subjugation 
of the Indian nations as a matter of ‘law.’”45
Johnson v. McIntosh, with its core pretension of “discovery” of in-
habited lands, is doctrinally suspect.46  It is also historically inaccurate.  
Chief Justice John Marshall’s claim of “universal recognition” of the 
doctrine of discovery is fictive.47  The discovery doctrine was always a 
controversial and controverted rationale.48
 37 David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M’Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. 
United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 159, 166 (1994). 
 38 David E. Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A Treaty-Based Reap-
praisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277, 315 (1998).  See also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 710 (1991) (Marshall’s mes-
sage in Johnson v. McIntosh was that “the natural rights of human beings to dispose of 
property that they held by virtue of possession did not apply to Indians in America.”). 
 39 Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: 
The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 303, 304 (1993). 
 40 Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the 
United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637, 648 (1978). 
 41 Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of 
Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 79 n.94 (1998). 
 42 Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation 
of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (2000). 
 43 Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of Federal In-
dian Law, 64 N.D. L. REV. 73, 94 (1988). 
 44 Robert B. Porter, Two Kinds of Indians, Two Kinds of Indian Nation Sovereignty: A 
Surreply to Professor Lavelle, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 637 (2002). 
 45 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Braid of Feathers: Pluralism, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and 
the Importance of Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 557, 565 (1996) (review-
ing FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995)). 
 46 See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra Part IV. 
 48 See infra Part III. 
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III. ROGER WILLIAMS AND “THE SINNE OF THE PATTENTS” 
Roger and Mary Williams came to Massachusetts in February 
1631.49  At this time, there were three primary English settlements: 
Plymouth, Salem, and most recently, Boston.  The Plymouth Colony 
was founded in December 1620 by the Mayflower Pilgrims, a separa-
tist Puritan sect that had secured a land patent from the London 
Virginia Company.50  The Pilgrims established their settlement in a 
location beyond the domain of the Virginia Company, but came to an 
agreement with the Plymouth Council for New England, which on 
November 3, 1620 had been granted a charter by King James I for the 
lands at issue.51  Without any mention of Indians or Indian land 
rights, James granted to the Council, for their “sole . . . and proper 
Use” and to “their Successors and Assignes for ever,”52 a patent, or 
exclusive title, to “all the . . . Lands and Grounds . . . of America” 
from 40 to 48 degrees northern latitude, “from Sea to Sea,” together 
with “the Firme Lands, Soyles, Grounds, Havens, Ports, Rivers, Wa-
ters, Fishings, Mines, and Mineralls.”53
Salem and Boston, located to the north of Plymouth, were set-
tlements within the Massachusetts Bay Colony.54  In 1629, Williams 
became acquainted with John Winthrop, who in that year had been 
elected the Colony’s governor while still in England.55  James I died 
in 1625 and was succeeded by Charles I, his son, “who ruled with little 
respect for either Parliament or the Puritans.”56  Nevertheless, a 
group of Puritan merchants in 1628 were granted land in Massachu-
 49 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 24. 
 50 Id. at 14. 
 51 John T. Juricek, English Territorial Claims in North America under Elizabeth and the 
Early Stuarts, in 7 TERRAE INCOGNITAE, THE ANNALS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF 
DISCOVERIES 18–19 (1975); Lindsay G. Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian: 
Reconsidering the Origins of the Discovery Doctrine, 13 J.L. & POL. 759, 762 (1997) [here-
inafter Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian]. 
 52 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1834 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [herein-
after 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 53 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Charter of New England: 1620, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/mass01.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).  
The line for 48 degrees north latitude lies north of Maine and runs through Canada 
and northern Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington.  The line 
for 40 degrees north latitude serves as north boundary of Kansas, and runs through 
California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. 
 54 PETER C. HOLLORAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLAND 284–85 (2003). 
 55 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 20. 
 56 Id. at 19. 
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setts and, on March 4, 1629, the grant was confirmed by a royal char-
ter.57  King Charles, also without any mention of Indians or Indian 
land rights, granted to the Massachusetts Bay Company “all that Parte 
of Newe England” described in the charter “and all Landes and He-
reditaments whatsoever, lyeing within the Lymitts aforesaide, . . . 
from the Atlantick and Westerne Sea and Ocean on the Easte Parte, 
to the South Sea on the West Parte.”58
Although the 1620 and 1629 royal charters made no mention of 
the Indians who occupied the lands granted, John Winthrop and 
other Puritans were aware of the native presence.  In a 1621 tract de-
fending “the Lawfulness of Removing out of England into the Parts of 
America,” Pilgrim apologist Robert Cushman declared Indian lands 
to be “‘spacious and void,’” and thus available to Englishmen.59  Win-
throp, who studied law at Gray’s Inn and became an attorney at the 
Court of Wards in London, advanced similar arguments eight years 
later, just prior to his departure for the New World: 
As for the Natives in New England, they inclose noe Land, neither 
have any setled habytation, nor any tame Cattle to improve the 
Land by, and soe have noe other but a Naturall Right to those 
Countries, soe as if we leave them sufficient for their use, we may 
lawfully take the rest, there being more than enough for them 
and us.60
 57 Id. at 20. 
 58 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 52, at 1849–50.  See also 
WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF 
NEW ENGLAND 70–71 (1983) (“In the case of the Massachusetts Bay Company’s char-
ter, the King conferred the lands of the grant . . . ‘in free and common Socage.’. . . 
[F]ree and common socage—in some senses, the least feudal of medieval tenures—
conceived of land simply as property carrying an economic rent, a rent which was of-
ten negligible.  In Massachusetts, the Crown’s only claim was to receive one-fifth of 
all the gold and silver found there.  Given New England geology, the burden did not 
prove onerous.”); DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 16–17 (Henry Steele Commager 
ed., 5th ed. 1949); GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 32; The Winthrop Society, Charter of 
the Massachusetts Bay Company, 4 March, 1628/29, http://www.winthropsociety. 
org/doc_charter.php (last visited Dec. 26, 2005) (rendered into modern English by 
John Beardsley). 
 59 CRONON, supra note 58, at 56.  See also JOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, PROFITS IN THE 
WILDERNESS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 117 (1991) (Cushman justified taking Indian land on the 
grounds that, “[b]ecause the Indians let the land lie ‘idle and waste . . . it is lawful 
now to take a land which none useth, and make use of it.’”). 
 60 ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS, 1620–1675, 
at 110 (1965). 
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Most land in America, according to Winthrop, was vacuum domicilium, 
or empty space.61  The “savage people” had not enclosed or improved 
it, and due to smallpox, “God hath consumed the natives with a mi-
raculous plague, whereby the greater part of the country is left void 
of inhabitants.”62  Consequently, “Christians have liberty to go and 
dwell amongst them in their waste lands and woods (leaving them 
such places as they have manured for their corn) as lawfully as Abra-
ham did among the Sodomites.”63  John Cotton, a Boston minister 
and contemporary of Winthrop and Williams, also embraced the 
emergent international law doctrine of vacuum domicilium, writing 
that, “[i]n a vacant soyle, hee that taketh possession of it, and be-
stoweth culture and husbandry upon it, his Right it is.”64
 61 Samuel Hugh Brockunier, The Irrepressible Democrat: Roger Williams, reprinted in 
ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE MASSACHUSETTS MAGISTRATES 44 (Theodore P. Greene ed., 
1964). 
 62 CHARLES DEANE, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER 7 n.† 
(1873).  See also MICHAEL LEROY OBERG, DOMINION AND CIVILITY: ENGLISH IMPERIALISM 
AND NATIVE AMERICA, 1585–1685, at 84 (1999) (Puritan John White, in 1630, noted 
that disease had “swept away most of the Inhabitants all along the Sea Coast, and in 
some places utterly consumed man, woman, & childe, so that there is no person left 
to lay claime to the soyle which they possessed.”) (citing JOHN WHITE, THE PLANTERS 
PLEA 14 (1630)).  Id. at 85 (“Why, [Winthrop] asked, ‘should we stand striving here 
[in England] for places of habitation, etc. (many men spending as much labor & 
coste to recover or keepe an acre or twoe of Land, as would procure them many & as 
good or better in another Countrie) & in the meane time suffer a whole Continent 
as fruitfull & convenient for the use of man to lie waste wthout any improvement?”). 
 Eric Kades notes that, to obtain Indian lands “at bargain prices,” the United 
States government was not required, in most instances, “to resort to violence or even 
threats to lower the price of Indian lands.  Its most powerful alternative was breath-
takingly simple: settlement on the frontier.  Settlers killed relatively few Indians in 
raids, massacres, skirmishes and the like.  They killed many more by spreading en-
demic diseases like smallpox.”  Kades, supra note 42, at 1105.  John Winthrop 
attributed a divine purpose to such epidemics, writing that “[t]he Natives are near all 
dead of the smallpox, so as the Lord hath cleared our title to what we possess.”  
OBERG, supra, at 85 (quoting Winthrop to Sir Nathaniel Rich, May 22, 1634). 
 63 DEANE, supra note 62, at 7 n.†.  See also VAUGHAN, supra note 60, at 110 (“Bol-
stered by innumerable Old Testament citations, the New England Puritans tried to 
convince themselves and others that land not being used by the heathen was open to 
any who would make use of it.”); Brockunier, supra note 61, at 44 (“Even before em-
barking from the homeland, Winthrop had dug into the Old Testament for the 
warrant of Higher Law.  The cases of Ephron the Hittite, Jacob and Hamor’s land, 
and the relations of Abimelech’s servants with Isaac’s readily came to hand, and Win-
throp concluded that the Indians had only a ‘natural right’ to the soil, the right of 
occupancy.”). 
 64 CRONON, supra note 58, at 56–57.  See NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND 
PROVIDENCE: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE MAKING OF NEW ENGLAND, 1500–1643, at 
176–77 (1982) (describing the vacuum domicilium doctrine as spelled out by John 
Winthrop). 
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The legalities of colonization appeared settled: Massachusetts 
belonged to England by virtue of discovery; and the King’s right to 
grant the lands by issuing patents was justified—in the minds of the 
Puritans—by the doctrine of vacuum domicilium.65  Patent and posses-
sion sufficed; acquiring title to land by purchase from the Indians was 
unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, even prior to Williams’ arrival in 1631, Englishmen 
were transacting with Indians in both public and private capacities.  
In 1625 New England colonists asked the Pemaquid tribe to give 
them 12,000 acres of Pemaquid land, which the tribe did in “the first 
deed of Indian land to English colonists.”66  A month later, in May 
1629, John Whelewright and others, by private purchase, were 
deeded lands in upper New England by the Pisquataqua Indians.67  In 
fact, John Winthrop himself transacted with natives in 1642 for 1,260 
acres along the Concord River.68  These purchases, however, were 
based on expediency rather than a change in legal principle.  In April 
1629 the Salem Colony was instructed from London that “[i]f any of 
the savages pretend right of inheritance to all or any part of the land 
granted in our patent, we pray you endeavor to purchase their title, 
that we may avoid the least scruple of intrusion.”69  Indian title was never 
officially acknowledged as equivalent or superior to title to lands held 
under royal patent. 
The question of Indian land rights was not foremost on Roger 
Williams’ mind as he arrived in Boston.  Williams resolved to seek in 
New England the liberty of conscience denied him in the England of 
 65 Chester E. Eisinger, The Puritan’s Justification for Taking the Land, 84 ESSEX INST. 
HIST. COLLECTION 131 (1948). 
 66 Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade?  An Economic Model of 
Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39, 54 (1994) (quoting DEE BROWN, BURY MY 
HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 3 (1970)).  The doctrine of vacuum domicilium is sometimes 
denominated the doctrine of terra nullius. 
 67 Lindsay G. Robertson, Johnson v. M’Intosh Reargument, Brief for the Appellants, 
9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 852, 865 (2000) [hereinafter Robertson, Brief for the Appel-
lants]. 
 68 Olive P. Dickason, Concepts of Sovereignty at the Time of First Contacts, in THE LAW 
OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD 236 (L.C. Green & Olive P. Dickason eds., 1989).  
See also Francis Jennings, Virgin Land and Savage People, 23 AM. Q. 519, 522 (1966), 
reprinted in INDIANS AND EUROPEANS: SELECTED ARTICLES ON INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN 
COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 103 (Peter Charles Hoffer ed., 1988) (“New England’s re-
cords abound with deeds attesting to purchases by 17th century Englishmen from 
stipulatedly rightful Indian landlords.  These documents, including a deed in the 
name of John Winthrop himself, testify that Winthrop’s doctrine of vacuum domicil-
ium was quietly abandoned after 1633.”). 
 69 DEANE, supra note 62, at 10 n.* (emphasis added). 
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King Charles and Bishop William Laud.70  He embraced the principle 
of Separatism, and consequently declined an invitation to serve as 
pastor in Boston because the church, in his view, had not broken suf-
ficiently with Anglicanism.  In April 1631, Williams and his wife left 
for Salem, but stayed only for a few months, leaving the jurisdiction 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in August 1631 to settle at Ply-
mouth.71  They remained in the Plymouth Colony for two years. 
While in Plymouth, Williams served as assistant to the pastor and 
became acquainted with the neighboring Indians.  He became “great 
friends” with Massasoit, sachem of the Wampanoags, and also was on 
friendly terms with Canonicus, aged leader of the Narragansetts.72  By 
letter to John Winthrop, Williams declared that “I am no Elder in any 
church . . . nor ever shall be, if the Lord please to grant my desires 
that I may intend what I long after, the natives souls.”73  Already famil-
iar with Latin, Greek, French, and Dutch (which he had taught John 
Milton in exchange for Hebrew lessons), Williams soon became con-
versant in local languages, particularly the Narragansett dialect.74  In 
fact, Roger Williams’ first published book focused not on the theo-
logical positions for which he is most famous, but rather on 
anthropology, linguistics, and native customs.  The book, A Key into 
the Language of America, was published in 1643 during a visit to Eng-
land, but was primarily based on observations made while in 
Plymouth.75  In Chapter VII (“Of their Persons and parts of body”), 
Williams expressed his views in verse: 
Boast not proud English, of thy birth & blood, 
Thy brother Indian is by birth as Good. 
Of one blood God made Him, and Thee & All, 
As wise, as faire, as strong, as personall.76
With respect to Indian land rights, Williams’ empirical observations, 
set forth in Chapter XVI (“Of the earth and the fruits thereof”), chal-
 70 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
 71 Brockunier, supra note 61, at 40. 
 72 Id. at 42.  See also DONALD A. GRINDE, JR. & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR OF 
LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 74 (1991).  Massasoit was 
the father of Metacom, called King Philip by the English. 
 73 Brockunier, supra note 61, at 42. 
 74 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 28.  As a youth, Williams was the protégé and scribe 
of Sir Edward Coke, the famous jurist and Lord Chief Justice of England, and was 
educated at Cambridge University.  Id. at 5. 
 75 Id. 
 76 ROGER WILLIAMS, A KEY INTO THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICA 133 (Wayne State Univ. 
Press 1973) (1643).  Williams also noted that “[n]ature knowes no difference be-
tween Europe and Americans in blood, birth, bodies, &c. God having of one blood 
made all mankind, Acts 17. and all by nature being children of wrath, Ephes. 2.”  Id. 
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lenged the doctrine of vacuum domicilium and the accompanying no-
tion that Europeans were entitled to appropriate native property 
without purchase because Indians made insufficient use of such 
lands: 
The Natives are very exact and punctuall in the bounds of their 
Lands . . . And I have knowne them make bargaine and sale 
amongst themselves for a small piece, or quantity of Ground: 
notwithstanding a sinfull opinion among many that Christians 
have right to Heathens Lands: but of the delusion of that phrase, I 
have spoke in a discourse. . . .77
The “discourse” referenced in A Key into the Language of America 
was a treatise written by Williams in 1632 while at Plymouth.  Gover-
nor William Bradford apparently asked Williams—whom he deemed 
“‘a man godly and zealous’”78—to express his views on the right of 
Puritans to be in America.79  Williams presented his ideas in “a large 
book in quarto,”80 prepared for the governor and council’s private 
consideration.  At some point thereafter, Williams carried the treatise 
to Governor John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, who 
had heard of the writing and inquired about it.81  Instead of burning 
it upon completion, as requested,82 Winthrop passed along the manu-
script to his Council and to the “most judicious ministers”83 in 
Boston, including John Cotton.84
 77 ROSMARIE WALDROP, A KEY INTO THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICA xvii (New Directions 
Publ’g 1994).  See also SALISBURY, supra note 64, at 198 (“Williams recognized that In-
dian hunting and burning were not the random activities assumed in the law of 
vacuum domicilium but systematic, rational uses of land in the same sense that cultiva-
tion was for Europeans.”).  Prior to Roger Williams, John Smith of Virginia observed 
that the natives encountered by the Jamestown settlers “lived with the understanding 
of precise boundaries demarcating the land of each tribe.”  Kathy Squadrito, Locke 
and the Dispossession of the American Indian, 20 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 145, 151 
(1996). 
 78 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 27. 
 79 GRINDE, JR. & JOHANSEN, supra note 72, at 74 (“Asked by William Bradford to 
compose a paper on the compact which established the Puritan colony in America, 
Williams began by declaring that the agreement was invalid.”). 
 80 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY: THE 
SETTLEMENTS 472 n.4 (1934). 
 81 DEANE, supra note 62, at 3. 
 82 Id. at 4. 
 83 ERNST, supra note 6, at 101. 
 84 ANDREWS, supra note 80, at 472 n.4; Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma: 
The Story of John Winthrop (1958), reprinted in ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE MASSACHUSETTS 
MAGISTRATES, supra note 61, at 89.  See also GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 28 (“Toward the 
end of 1633, he fell ‘into some strange opinions,’ Governor Bradford reported, 
‘which caused some controversy between the church and him.’”). 
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Roger Williams’ treatise is not extant, and was likely destroyed by 
Massachusetts officials.  It is evident, however, that Williams, the “dis-
senter extraordinaire,”85 denounced the royal patents of 1620 and 
1629 as illegal expropriations,86 and questioned the right of Plymouth 
(and, by extension, all colonies), to Indian lands possessed but not 
purchased.87  Simply put, if the rights to land in the New World had 
not yet been voluntarily transferred, complete ownership remained 
with the Indians, “from whom alone a valid title could be derived,” 
and therefore colonists should “repent of receiving title by patent 
from a king who had no right to grant it.”88  Neither possession of 
“waste” lands (vacuum domicilium) nor patent sufficed; purchase alone 
justified occupation.89  Williams laid down the gauntlet: if Europeans 
wished to own America, they must buy America from the Indians.  In 
the words of his biographer Edwin Gaustad, 
Williams questioned the very right of the English to occupy land 
that properly belonged to the Indians.  What was it about Chris-
tendom, Williams wondered, that empowered Christian kings to 
give away land that wasn’t even theirs?  English colonization was 
nothing more than “a sin of unjust usurpation upon others’ pos-
sessions.”  Indians owned the land before Europeans arrived; they 
would continue to own the land until appropriate purchases or 
agreements had been made.90
 85 Nathan O. Hatch, Introduction to GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at x. 
 86 DEANE, supra note 62, at 8 (“He seems to have included in his denunciations 
the grand patent of King James, of Nov. 3, 1620, and that of Charles I., to Massachu-
setts.”). 
 87 ERNST, supra note 6, at 80. Wilcomb Washburn characterizes Williams as “one 
of the few Englishmen who dared to dismiss European claims to American soil as un-
justified and illegal if the prior right of the Indian were not recognized.”  Wilcomb E. 
Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing the Indians, in 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 25 (James Morton 
Smith ed., 1959).  Samuel Brockunier more succinctly describes the founder of 
Rhode Island as “one of the few Englishmen who demanded equal justice for the na-
tives.”  Brockunier, supra note 61, at 43.  Massachusetts native John Quincy Adams, 
on the other hand, once referred to Williams as “a polemical porcupine.”  Hatch, su-
pra note 85, at ix. 
 88 Washburn, supra note 87, at 25.  See also BARBARA ARNEIL, JOHN LOCKE AND 
AMERICA: THE DEFENCE OF ENGLISH COLONIALISM 82–84 (1996); Eisinger, supra note 
65, at 131–43. 
 89 VAUGHAN, supra note 60, at 119. 
 90 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 32.  See also 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER 
WILLIAMS, 1629–1653, at 15 (Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988) (setting forth Williams’ 
argument that the English kings had unjustly used Christianity as a rationale for de-
priving Indians of their rights to lands). 
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Not surprisingly, the arguments of Roger Williams “against the 
King’s Patent and Authority”91 were viewed with much trepidation by 
Massachusetts officials, insofar as “they struck at the very foundations 
of the colonial governments which drew their authority from grants 
by the Crown.”92  On January 3, 1633, John Winthrop wrote to John 
Endicott, his predecessor as governor of the Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony, and outlined an initial response to Williams’ treatise: 
But if our title be not good, neither by Patent, nor possession of 
these parts as vacuum Domicilium nor by good liking of the natives, 
I mervayle by what title Mr. Williams himselfe holdes.  & if God 
were not pleased with our inheritinge these partes, why did he 
drive out the natives before us?  & why dothe he still make roome 
for us, by diminishing them as we increase? . . . If we had no right 
to this lande, yet our God hathe right to it, & if he be pleased to 
give it us (takinge it from a people who had so longe usurped 
upon him, & abused his creatures) who shall controll him or his 
terms?93
Williams returned to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony in August 1633 when he moved back to Salem to assist the 
town’s minister.  By year’s end, Governor Winthrop and his assistants 
met in Boston and determined that “Mr. Williams . . . should be con-
 91 DEANE, supra note 62, at 4 (“William Coddington, in a letter published [in a 
book dated 1678] says that Williams’ book [was] ‘against the King’s Patent and Au-
thority.’”). 
 92 MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 199.  See also CYCLONE COVEY, THE GENTLE RADICAL: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF ROGER WILLIAMS 94 (1966) (Winthrop complained that Williams “pro-
voked our Kinge against vs, and putt a sworde into his hande to destroye vs.”); JOHN 
GARRETT, ROGER WILLIAMS: WITNESS BEYOND CHRISTENDOM 15 (1970) (“Danger 
threatened all the Bay Colonies during the early 1630’s because of the attempts of 
James I and his advisers to forestall the development of a Puritan transatlantic 
stronghold against the homeland’s policies.  People like [John] Cotton and [John] 
Winthrop did not want their colony to appear in blacker colours than it really wore—
as a nest of Separatism.  They sought further reforms of the Church of England, all 
in loyal spirit.  Williams, more radical, was condemning the Church of England as in 
league with the anti-Christ.”); JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 495 
(George F. Comstock ed., 11th ed. 1867) (“[Williams’] essay, in which he maintained 
that an English patent could not invalidate the rights of the native inhabitants of this 
country, [was] condemned by the government in Massachusetts, in 1634, as sounding 
like treason against the cherished charter of the colony.”); Morgan, supra note 84, at 
89 (“In order to appreciate the shock which this document must have given the mag-
istrates of Massachusetts, one must remember that the English Civil War had not 
begun and that the Massachusetts Bay Company had gained its control over the col-
ony by virtue of a patent from the King.”). 
 93 DEANE, supra note 62, at 7.  Deane points out in a footnote that “Mr. Williams 
owned a house in Salem, which he mortgaged about the time of his removal from 
the Colony.”  Id. at 7 n.*. 
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vented at the next court, to be censured, etc.”94  In his journal, Win-
throp noted that Williams “concluded that, claiming by the king’s 
grant, they could have no title, nor otherwise, except they com-
pounded with the natives,” and “chargeth King James to have told a 
solemn public lie, because in his patent he blessed God that he was 
the first Christian prince that had discovered this land.”95  At the next 
Court, on March 4, 1634, Williams appeared penitently and, accord-
ing to Winthrop, “gave satisfaction of his intention and loyalty.”96  On 
this same date, the General Court97 enacted a law regulating the pur-
chase of Indian lands, ordering “that no Person whatsoever, Shall 
henceforth buy land of any Indians without License first had and ob-
tained of the General Court, and if any offend herein, such Land so 
bought shall be forfeited to the Country.”98
Williams’ penitence was short-lived.  Back in Salem, he protested 
the “sinfulness” of the patent in his sermons and “conducted days of 
public humiliation among his parishioners for their having used it to 
usurp land from the natives.”99  On November 27, 1634, Governor 
Winthrop duly noted in his journal that the Council was informed 
 94 John Winthrop’s Journal (Dec. 27, 1633), reprinted in ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE 
MASSACHUSETTS MAGISTRATES, supra note 61, at 2. 
 95 Id. 
 96 ERNST, supra note 6, at 104. 
 97 The General Court was an “amalgam of the governor and his assistants that 
functioned as a legislative, judicial, and executive body all in one . . . .”  GAUSTAD, su-
pra note 7, at 32–33. 
 98 JEAN M. O’BRIEN, DISPOSSESSION BY DEGREES: INDIAN LAND AND IDENTITY IN 
NATICK, MASSACHUSETTS, 1650–1790, at 71 (1997).  See also VAUGHAN, supra note 60, at 
114 (“During the first few years of its existence, Massachusetts Bay imposed no re-
strictions on the purchase of land from the natives; both towns and individuals freely 
contracted for land.  Then, in the spring of 1634, the General Court, following a 
Plymouth precedent, decreed that no one could buy Indian lands without the 
Court’s permission.”); Kades, supra note 42, at 1079 (“Massachusetts apparently 
adopted the first such official law [requiring government approval of Indian pur-
chases] in 1634 . . . .”).  Other sources state that the General Court first prohibited 
the purchase of lands from Indians without license from the government in 1633.  See 
KENT, supra note 92, at 496; J.P. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST—A CIVILIZATION WON: 
INDIAN LAND TENURE IN AMERICA 6–7 (Octagon Books 1975) (1937); 1 RECORDS OF 
THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 111–12 
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1968); James Muldoon, Discovery, Grant, Charter, Conquest, 
or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession of North America, in THE 
MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 43 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann 
eds., 2001).  See also Jennings, supra note 68, at 519, reprinted in INDIANS AND 
EUROPEANS: SELECTED ARTICLES ON INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN COLONIAL NORTH 
AMERICA 115 (Peter Charles Hoffer ed., 1988) (“The General Court responded with a 
series of new laws, the first of which was a ban on the purchase of Indian lands ex-
cept when such purchase had prior approval from the court.”) (citing Minutes, Mar. 
4, 1634 (Old Style 1633), Recs. of Mass. 1:112). 
 99 SALISBURY, supra note 64, at 195. 
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“that Mr. Williams of Salem had broken his promise to us, in teaching 
publickly against the king’s patent, and our great sin in claiming right 
thereby to this country, etc.”100  The General Court declined to take 
immediate action, but Williams persisted in claiming that “‘the Na-
tives are true owners of all they possess or improve,’”101 and as a result 
he “stood once more before the bar of Massachusetts justice.”102  On 
October 9, 1635, the General Court declared that Williams “hath 
broached & divulged diverse new & dangerous opinions,” and or-
dered “that the said Mr. Williams shall depart out of this jurisdiction 
within six weeks.”103
In January 1636 a Captain Underhill was instructed to put Roger 
Williams on board his ship for England.104  However, when Underhill 
arrived in Salem, Williams was gone.  John Winthrop quietly advised 
him to leave the colony, and Williams left his wife and children and 
“journeyed by land, during an inclement winter season and through 
forests largely unknown to the white man, until he found a refuge 
among the Indians.”105  Both Massasoit and Canonicus aided Williams 
as he made his way southward, beyond the jurisdiction of both the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Plymouth Colony.  In June, Wil-
liams and a few of his followers reached present-day Rhode Island: 
When he arrived at the headwaters of Narragansett Bay, he de-
cided to stop.  Here he would occupy land only by agreement with 
the Indians (no patent from King Charles); here he would bring 
family and send for friends and neighbors; here he would name 
 100 John Winthrop’s Journal (Nov. 27, 1634), reprinted in ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE 
MASSACHUSETTS MAGISTRATES, supra note 61, at 2. 
 101 ERNST, supra note 6, at 100. 
 102 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 37.  Williams’ view on Indian land rights was not the 
only basis for his banishment; for example, he regarded fellowship with the Church 
of England as grievous sin.  See ANDREWS, supra note 80, at 472 (“The causes of [the 
banishment of Roger Williams] were in part political and in part a matter of church 
polity.”); GARRETT, supra note 92, at 198 (quoting Cotton Mather [1663–1728] in say-
ing, “‘his banishment proceeded not against him, or his, for his own refusal of any 
worship, but for seditious opposition against the Patent and against the oath of fidel-
ity offered to the people.’”). 
 103 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 37. 
 104 Williams’ sojourn from Massachusetts to Rhode Island is described in GRINDE, 
JR. & JOHANSEN, supra note 72, at 76; GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 45–46; 2 CHARLES M. 
ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY: THE SETTLEMENTS 4–5 (1936). 
 105 ANDREWS, supra note 104, at 4.  “As Williams himself later recounted, Winthrop 
had ‘many high and heavenly and public ends’ in directing him to Narragansett Bay, 
particularly ‘the freeness of the place from any English claims or patents.’”  
SALISBURY, supra note 64, at 213 (letter, dated June 22, 1670, from Roger Williams to 
Major John Mason and Governor Thomas Prence). 
WATSON 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  8:36:03 AM 
2006] JOHN MARSHALL AND INDIAN LAND RIGHTS 497 
 
his village Providence, “in a Sense of God’s merciful Providence 
to me in my distress.”106
The grant of land was put into legal form in 1638 when Canoni-
cus and Miantonomo declared in a deed that, “having two years since 
sold unto Roger Williams the land and meadows, upon . . . Mooshas-
suc and Woonasquatucket, do now by these present establish and 
confirm the bounds of these lands.”107  However, Massachusetts and 
Plymouth asserted claims to this territory, and in 1643 Williams went 
to England—then in the midst of civil war—and secured from the de 
facto government a charter for “Providence Plantations.”108  Williams 
presumably considered the charter “as only a confirmation of his In-
dian purchases and not as a grant of land from a higher authority in 
England.”109  Indeed, the 1643 charter makes no mention of any prior 
right of the crown to the soil,110 and the subsequent 1663 Charter of 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations explicitly states that the 
lands in question “are possessed, by purchase and consent of the said 
natives, to their full content.”111  Thus, in contrast to other colonial 
charters, the royal charter of Rhode Island—secured from King 
Charles II following the Restoration—“acknowledged the original 
rights of the Indians to the soil.”112
In Chapter XXV of A Key into the Language of America (“Of buying 
and selling”), Roger Williams foretold much of the history of Indians 
and Indian land rights in America: 
Oft have I heard these Indians say, 
These English will deliver us. 
Of all that’s ours, our lands and lives. 
In th’ end, they will bereave us.113
On another occasion, in 1652, Williams decried “the sinne of the 
Pattents, wherein Christian Kings (so calld) are invested with Right by 
 106 GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 46. 
 107 ERNST, supra note 6, at 185. 
 108 DEANE, supra note 62, at 17.  See also GAUSTAD, supra note 7, at 58 (noting that 
when Williams arrived in England in 1643, “Charles had fled London, Laud was in 
the Tower, and Puritan Roundheads were fighting Royalist Cavaliers.”). 
 109 ANDREWS, supra note 104, at 25. 
 110 Id. 
 111 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3211 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 112 ERNST, supra note 6, at 399.  See also Greene v. Rhode Island, 289 F. Supp. 2d 5, 
7 (D.R.I. 2003) (“In contrast to other colonies’ charters, the Rhode Island Charter 
[of 1663] provided that the Indians had title to Indian lands . . . .”). 
 113 WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 167.  To  “bereave” is to “deprive ruthlessly or by 
force.”  RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 127 (1973). 
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virtue of their Christianitie, to take and give away the Lands and 
Countries of other men.”114  This unswerving position of Roger Wil-
liams—that “the sinne of the Pattents”115 was “a sin of unjust 
usurpation upon others’ possessions”116—stands as one point of re-
buttal to John Marshall’s claim, in Johnson v. McIntosh,117 of “universal 
recognition” of the view that European discovery of lands in America 
“necessarily diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose of 
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”118  Roger Wil-
liams believed, as did the shareholders of the Illinois and Wabash 
Land Company, that Indians owned the lands they occupied and 
could sell their land rights to any purchaser. 
IV. EUROPEAN VIEWS OF INDIAN LAND RIGHTS DURING  
“THE AGE OF DISCOVERY” 
John Cotton, on the other hand, believed with equal fervor that 
the “dangerous opinions” of his friend Roger Williams “subverted the 
state and government of this country, and tended to unsettle the 
kingdoms and commonwealths of Europe.”119  It is evident that the 
international law of the seventeenth century, which was “created by 
world powers and designed for their ends,” for the most part “sanc-
tioned the practice which Williams protested.”120  However, the 
degree of emphasis placed on discovery, patent, possession, and pur-
chase varied among the colonizing nations.  A survey of European 
 114 Eisinger, supra note 65, at 131.  Williams’ denunciation of “the sinne of the 
Pattents” is found in The Bloody Tenent yet more Bloody: by Mr. Cotton’s Endeavor to wash it 
white in the Blood of the LAMBE; Of whose precious Blood, spilt in the Blood of his Servants; 
and of the Blood of Millions spilt in former and later Wars for Conscience sake, THAT Most 
Bloody Tenent of Persecution for cause of Conscience, upon, a second Tryal is found now more 
apparently and more notoriously guilty, etc. (London 1652) in 4 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS 
OF ROGER WILLIAMS 461 (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963).  Williams in general decried 
the acquisitive nature of the New England colonists, and “feared that ‘God Land will 
be (as now it is) as great a God with us English as God Gold was with the Spaniards.’”  
MARTIN, supra note 59, at 118. 
 115 Eisinger, supra note 65, at 131. 
 116 Id. 
 117 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 118 Id. at 574.  See Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian, supra note 51, at 
761–62.  Compare Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573 (“[D]iscovery gave title to the 
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other 
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”) with 
MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 368 (“In settling this continent, the European powers es-
timated at nothing the right of the natives.  Among themselves, it was recognised, as 
a ruling principle, that those, who first discovered and took possession of any particu-
lar territory, became its rightful proprietors.”). 
 119 ERNST, supra note 6, at 445. 
 120 Brockunier, supra note 61, at 44. 
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views of Indian land rights during “the age of discovery” reveals di-
vergent opinions on the issues which controlled the outcome of the 
Illinois-Wabash purchase and the Johnson v. McIntosh litigation: 
whether native Americans owned the lands they occupied, and, if so, 
whether such ownership rights could be sold or otherwise transferred 
to private individuals. 
A. Spanish Views of Indian Land Rights 
Spanish views of Indian land rights, during the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, were based largely on the pre-Columbian “Catholic 
conceptualization of the rights of non-Christian peoples.”121  Robert 
Williams, Jr., in his book, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 
traced the western world’s “discourses of conquest” to at least the 
thirteenth century, when Pope Innocent IV (1243–1254) asked, re-
ferring to the Crusades, whether it is “licit to invade a land that 
infidels possess, or which belongs to them?”122  Pope Innocent IV con-
sidered two opposing positions: that “infidels, by virtue of their 
nonbelief, possessed no rights to dominium that Christians were re-
quired to recognize” and on the other hand, that “infidels possessed 
the natural-law right to hold property and exercise lordship.”123  In-
nocent IV adopted the position that wars could not be waged against 
 121 See Worthen, supra note 30, at 1375 (“As the Spanish and Portuguese spread 
Western European influence outside the Mediterranean region, they carried with 
them the Catholic conceptualization of the rights of non-Christian peoples.”). 
 122 WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
36, at 44 (quoting THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191–92 (J. Muldoon 
ed., 1977)).  See also Michael L. Tate, Book Review, 16 AM. INDIAN Q. 83, 83 (1992) 
(noting that Williams’ book “traces in detail the medieval antecedents that provided 
the rationale for the European conquest of America.”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Co-
lumbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Issue 2) 51, 56 (1991) [herein-
after Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy] (“Columbus and the other Europeans who 
followed him from the Old World carried the firm belief that Christian European 
culture and its accompanying religious forms, patterns of civilization and normative 
value structure were all superior to the diverse ways of life practiced and lived by the 
indigenous tribal peoples they encountered in the New World.  This Old World be-
lief was part of a venerable legal tradition which justified denying the rights of self-
rule to peoples whose cultures and religions were different from Christian Europe-
ans that was already nearly 400 years old by the time Columbus reached the New 
World.”); Worthen, supra note 30, at 1373 (“According to Williams, Western legal 
concepts concerning Native Americans derive from notions developed by the medie-
val Church concerning the status of non-Christians.”). 
The textual discussion of pre-Columbian views of non-Christians’ property rights 
is based in part on Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 437, 444–45 (1998). 
 123 WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
36, at 45. 
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infidels because of their non-belief, but held that the “pope possessed 
the authority to deprive infidels of their property and lordship in cer-
tain situations, such as . . . the failure to admit Christian missionaries 
peacefully or the violation of natural law.”124  Otherwise, without this 
limitation, all rational creatures “had the right under natural law to 
own property and to exercise political authority in their own lands.”125
The opposing point of view was championed by Henrico de Se-
gusio, cardinal of Ostia (d. 1271, generally known as Hostiensis), the 
most important canonist of the thirteenth century.  Hostiensis argued 
that the pope had de jure jurisdiction over all infidels, and, “since the 
dominion of infidels could never be just, it was always permissible to 
wage war on them.”126  Following the tradition of the British cleric 
Alanus Anglicus, an early thirteenth century advocate of absolute pa-
pal authority, Hostiensis contended that the pope possessed a 
“supreme and surpassing superiority and power and authority 
(which) has been granted him without reservation in all matters.”127  
As for non-Christian nations, Hostiensis concurred with Alanus An-
glicus that, by rejecting the true God and Church, infidels “were 
presumed to lack rights to property and lordship.”128
As noted by Olive Dickason, it was Hostiensis’ assertion of papal 
authority over non-believers, as opposed to the natural rights phi-
losophy of Innocent IV, that initially “fueled the ideological motor of 
Europe’s expansion.”129  In the agreement dated April 30, 1492, and 
entitled “The Privileges and Prerogatives Granted by Their Catholic 
 124 Id.  Innocent IV was commenting on Quod super his, a papal decretal of Inno-
cent III (pope, 1198–1216), who started the Fourth Crusade (1202–04) and called 
for the Fifth Crusade (1217–21) just prior to his death.  A decretal is a decree or let-
ter from the pope giving a decision on some point or question of canon law.  See id. 
 125 Dickason, supra note 68, at 151. 
 126 Id. at 151–52. 
 127 Id. 
 128 WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 
36, at 41 (“As for infidel nations, Alanus’s Crusading-era legal discourse denied any 
theoretical legitimacy to their dominium.  By their rejection of the true God and his 
chosen vicar the pope, all pagans were presumed to lack rights to property and lord-
ship.”). 
 129 Dickason, supra note 68, at 242.  See also JAMES MULDOON, THE AMERICAS IN THE 
SPANISH WORLD ORDER: THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONQUEST IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 32 (1994) (observing that “because all mankind is subject to the pope in 
spiritual matters and he is responsible for the salvation of all mankind, the pope may 
authorize Christian rulers to enter the lands of infidels, even those who pose no di-
rect military threat to Christians, in order to ensure that missionaries can preach 
there in safety.”); WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 36, at 65 (“Hostiensis’ own thirteenth-century commentary on Quod super 
his assumed prominence in Western legal thought and discourse as the standard re-
sponse to Innocent’s more naturalistically inspired thesis on the rights of infidels.”). 
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Majesties to Christopher Columbus,” King Ferdinand and Queen Isa-
bella of Spain expressed their hope to the explorer from Genoa that, 
“by God’s assistance, some of the said Islands and Continent in the 
ocean will be discovered and conquered by your means and con-
duct.”130  Columbus subsequently inaugurated the “Age of Discovery” 
on October 12, 1492, by landing on an island inhabited by Arawak 
natives.  He made no offer of purchase, but instead summarily an-
nounced, “with appropriate words and ceremony,” that the island was 
now the property of the Catholic sovereigns of Spain.131  As depicted 
by a Columbus biographer: 
The officers and crews came on shore and immediately took over 
the territory, making it out as a free gift to the King and Queen of 
Spain.  They called this ‘taking lawful possession of Guanahani, 
now to be called San Salvador in honour of our Saviour.’  The na-
tives from whom they took it watched the proceedings without 
resentment, for they had not the least idea what was happening.  
Having not yet arrived at the conception of property they were 
unable to conceive the idea of theft.132
Three days later, Columbus noted in his log book that “it was my wish 
to pass no island without taking possession of it.  Though having an-
nexed one it might be said that we annexed all.”133  Notwithstanding such 
sentiments, mere discovery of land, without effective occupation, was 
considered in the fifteenth century to confer at best an inchoate, in-
complete title.134  Thus, to buttress its assertion of ownership of newly 
explored portions of the African coast, Portugal had turned to the 
Pope for “confirmation and completion” of title claims based at first 
 130 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 1. 
 131 Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (1983) [hereinafter 
Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian]. 
 132 JOHN STEWART COLLIS, CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 81 (1977). 
 133 THE FOUR VOYAGES OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 60 (J.M. Cohen ed., 1969) (em-
phasis added). 
 134 MAX SAVELLE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
HISTORY OF ANGLOAMERICA, 1492–1763, at 195 (1967); Williams, Jr., Origins of the 
Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 32.  See also Friedrich August Freiherr 
von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International 
Law, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 448, 452 (1935): 
At no time was the fact of discovery alone regarded as capable of grant-
ing more than the right to later appropriation. . . . Whenever statesmen 
deduced sovereign rights from the bare fact of discovery, it was not be-
cause they were convinced of the correctness of their argumentation, 
but because they had no better arguments to support their political 
claims. 
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upon discovery.135  Likewise, to complete its title to the lands in Amer-
ica discovered by Columbus, Spain relied not only on discovery, but 
also sought the Pope’s authorization in the form of a papal grant.136
Two months after the return of Columbus, by the Papal Bull In-
ter Caetera of May 4, 1493, Pope Alexander VI drew an imaginary line 
of demarcation one hundred leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, 
and granted to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, and their de-
scendants, “all and singular aforesaid countries and islands . . . 
hitherto discovered . . . and to be discovered . . . together with all 
their dominions, cities, camps, places, villages, and all rights, jurisdic-
tions, and appurtenances of the same.”137  Lands located to the east of 
 135 SAVELLE, supra note 134, at 195. 
 136 Id.  Prior to the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, 
the Pope was recognized as having a decisive authority, both as an arbi-
ter of international disputes and, most emphatically, as having 
authority to dispose of heathen, non-Christian peoples and their terri-
tories in the interest of bringing them to Christianity. 
     . . . . 
     It was entirely in conformity with international practice, and with a 
reasonable expectation that the Pope’s pronouncements might be re-
spected as having the force of international law by the Western 
colonizing nations, . . . that Spain appealed in 1493 to papal authority 
for completion of its title to the lands in America discovered by Co-
lumbus . . . . 
Id. 
 137 WASHBURN, supra note 26, at 5.  A “papal bull” is “ the common term applied to 
documents stamped with a lead seal, and currently refer[s] to a form of papal docu-
ment that affects matters for a substantial portion of the church.”  HARPERCOLLINS 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLICISM 201 (Richard P. McBrien ed., 1995).  The Papal Bull 
Inter Caetera was the third of three Papal Bulls issued on May 3rd and 4th of 1493: 
Pope Alexander VI, himself a Spaniard, granted the request to confer 
the lately discovered lands on the Crown of Spain by three Bulls issued 
on May 3 and May 4 1493 . . . . 
     . . . . 
     Like the bull “Eximiae devotionis” of May 3, the bull “Inter Caetera” 
of May 4 is a restatement of part of the bull “Inter caetera” of May 3.  
Taken together the two later bulls cover the same ground as the bull 
“Inter caetera” of May 3, for which they form a substitute.  The changes 
introduced into the bull “Inter caetera” of May 4, are, however, of great 
importance, and highly favorable to Spain.  Instead of merely granting 
to Castile the lands discovered by her envoys, and not under Christian 
rule, the revised bull draws a line of demarcation one hundred leagues 
west of any of the Azores or Cape Verde Islands, and assigns to Castile 
the exclusive right to acquire territorial possessions and to trade in all 
lands west of that line, which at Christmas, 1492, were not in the pos-
session of any Christian prince.  The general safeguard to the possible 
conflicting rights of Portugal is lacking.  All persons are forbidden to 
approach the lands west of the line without special license from the 
rulers of Castile. 
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the line—“so long as they had not already been seized by any other 
Christian Prince”—were awarded to Portugal.138  The Pope and Spain 
viewed the Inter Caetera as a legal grant giving “full power of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction over the territories concerned, with the 
primary objective of spreading Christianity.”139  Fearing the Pope’s ul-
timate sanction of excommunication, all European nations respected 
the legitimacy of the Inter Caetera. 
The papal documents do not refer in any way to the property 
rights of the natives occupying the lands discovered by Spanish ex-
PAUL GOTTSCHALK, THE EARLIEST DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON AMERICA: THE PAPAL 
BULLS OF 1493 AND THE TREATY OF TORDESILLAS REPRODUCED AND TRANSLATED (1927), 
cited in Bulls Burning, The Papal Bulls as Pertaining to America, http://bullsburning. 
itgo.com/essays/Caetera.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005).  See also Williams, Jr., Ori-
gins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 33 (observing that “the newly 
elected Pope, Alexander VI (1492–1503), was the Spaniard Rodrigo Borgia.  Borgia 
owed not only the papal throne, but also his family’s own considerable fortune to the 
favors of the Castilian Crown.  For instance, Ferdinand legitimated Borgia’s bastard 
son, the famous cardinal and military leader Ceasar.”). 
 138 L.C. Green, Claims to Territory in Colonial America, in THE LAW OF NATIONS AND 
THE NEW WORLD 4 (L.C. Green & Olive P. Dickason eds., 1989).  The Treaty of Tord-
esillas, June 7, 1494, reset the line of demarcation at 370 leagues west of the Cape 
Verde Islands, giving Portugal its claim to Brazil.  DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 
supra note 58, at 4.  The Treaty of Tordesillas remained in force until January 13, 
1750, when the Treaty of Madrid annulled the boundary line.  GOTTSCHALK, supra 
note 137. 
 139 Green, supra note 138, at 6.  See also JULIUS GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
FALKLAND ISLANDS: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 79 (Yale Univ. Press 
1982) (1927) (observing that “the charge upon Ferdinand and Isabella to undertake 
the conversion of the natives was the real legal justification of the pope’s grant.”); 
MULDOON, supra note 129, at 32 (“The language of Inter caetera articulated in brief, in 
a kind of shorthand, the nature of Christian relations with non-Christian societies.”); 
MATTHEW RESTALL, SEVEN MYTHS OF THE SPANISH CONQUEST 68 (2003) (“Spaniards 
were the recipients of a divine grant of lands and peoples they had yet to find and 
see, let alone subdue.  This permitted claims of possession to be seen as synonymous 
with possession itself.”); Ali Friedberg, Reconsidering The Doctrine of Discovery: Spanish 
Land Acquisition in Mexico (1521–1821), 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 87, 96 (1999) (“A series of 
papal bulls had granted ‘title’ to Spain over Columbus’ non-Christian discoveries in 
the New World, and over any such future discoveries, for the purpose of spreading 
Christianity.”); Newcomb, supra note 39, at 314 (stating that “[the] early papal bulls  
. . . expressed religious rather than secular distinctions between Christians and in-
digenous nations, and assumed that the Christians possessed a right to subjugate 
heathens and infidels and appropriate their lands.”); Patricia Seed, Taking Possession 
and Reading Texts: Establishing the Authority of Overseas Empires, in COLONIAL AMERICA: 
ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 37 (Stanley N. Katz et al. eds., 2001) 
(noting that the Inter Caetera “gave Spain the exclusive right to present the Gospel to 
the natives of the New World and guaranteed Spain’s right to rule the land in order 
to secure the right to preach.”). 
WATSON 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  8:36:03 AM 
504 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:481 
 
plorers.140  Martín Fernández de Enciso, lawyer, geographer, naviga-
tor, and author of a book on America published in 1519, reported 
the story that a group of natives, “upon being informed of the papal 
donation, laughed and wondered that the pope would be so liberal 
with what was not his.”141  This view, which presaged Roger Williams’ 
characterization of the English royal patents, was not confined to 
those adversely impacted by the Papal Bull Inter Caetera.  There was 
much discussion of Indian land rights during the first half of the six-
teenth century in Spain, and Spaniard Domingo De Soto (1495–
1560) similarly exclaimed that “the Pope did not grant, nor could he 
grant, our kings dominion over these peoples and their affairs, be-
cause he had no right to it (himself).”142
A more famous theorist, Francisco de Vitoria (or Victoria), like-
wise advocated that, because the Pope “has no temporal power over 
the Indian aborigines or over other unbelievers,”143 a legitimate title 
to their lands cannot be traced “through the Supreme Pontiff.”144  Vi-
toria (ca. 1480–1546), was a Dominican Basque, taking his name 
from his native town, who never visited the New World, but neverthe-
less penned a lengthy treatise on the legitimate, and illegitimate, 
claims of the Spanish to Indian lands.145  As Primary Professor of Sa-
cred Theology at the University of Salamanca, in a series of lectures 
delivered in 1532, Vitoria addressed the question of “whether the 
aborigines in question were true owners in both private and public 
 140 Green, supra note 138, at 6.  Green goes on to note that, 
[w]hile there may occasionally have been reference to arrangements 
with the “savages/Indians” and even attempts to protect their rights in-
sofar as their person or property was concerned, at no time were they 
considered as the owners of their land or as being entitled to any role 
in connection with its disposition. 
Id. at 38. 
 141 Dickason, supra note 68, at 232.  The natives “also thought that the Spanish 
king must be poor because he was asking for land of others.”  Id.  For a variant of this 
story, see M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE BACKWARD 
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1926) (“The Peru-
vian Inca was not unreasonable when, hearing of the Pope and his commission to the 
Spaniards for the first time, he told Pizarro that the Pope ‘must be crazy to talk of 
giving away countries which do not belong to him.’”). 
 142 BERNICE HAMILTON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN: A STUDY 
OF THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF VITORIA, DE SOTO, SUÁREZ, AND MOLINA 179 (1963). 
 143 Francisci de Victoria, De Indis Et De Ivre Belli Relectiones (Ernest Nys, ed.), in THE 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (James Brown Scott, ed., 1964).  Francisco Victo-
ria is also known as Francisco de Vittoria, Franciscus de Victoria, Francisci de 
Victoria, and Francis Vitoria. 
 144 Id. at 134. 
 145 ARNEIL, supra note 88, at 77; HAMILTON, supra note 142, at 171; Williams, Jr., 
Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 70. 
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law before the arrival of the Spaniards; that is, whether they were true 
owners of private property . . . .”146  These lectures, known as De Indis et 
de jure belli relectiones or, alternatively, as On the Indians Lately Discovered, 
were published after his death through the efforts of his former stu-
dents, and are the reason Vitoria is often described as the “founder of 
modern international law.”147
Vitoria asserted that “the aborigines undoubtedly had true do-
minion in both public and private matters, just like Christians, and 
that neither their princes nor private persons could be despoiled of 
their property on the ground of their not being true owners.”148  He 
posited that the North American Indians “were neither chattels nor 
beasts, but human beings entitled to a modicum of respect as such, 
even from Catholics carrying the word of God.”149  Consistent with 
Innocent IV’s natural law ideology, and Roger Williams’ poetry, Vito-
ria subscribed to the view that “certain basic rights inhere in men as 
men, not by reason of their race, creed, or color, but by reason of 
their humanity.”150
 146 JAMES E. FALKOWSKI, INDIAN LAW/RACE LAW: A FIVE-HUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY 22 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
 147 Dickason, supra note 68, at 161; see also WASHBURN, supra note 26, at 9; Robert 
Yazzie, Cherokee Nation of Indians v. Georgia, Appeal from the Supreme Court of the 
United States to the Supreme Court of the American Indian Nations, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(Issue 2) 159, 159 (1999); Muldoon, supra note 98, at 28;.  Felix Cohen contended 
that “[o]ur concepts of Indian title . . . [i]n the main, . . . are to be traced to Spanish 
origins, and particularly to doctrines developed by Francisco de Vitoria, the real 
founder of modern international law.”  Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. 
L. REV. 28, 43–44 (1947).  See also Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American In-
dian, supra note 131, at 68 (noting that Vitoria’s “juridical system of a Law of Nations 
helped establish the foundations of modern international law.”). 
 148 Victoria, supra note 143, at 128.  Vitoria noted that, insofar as the “Saracens 
and Jews, who are persistent enemies of Christianity,” are nonetheless deemed “true 
owners of their property,” it “would be harsh to deny” similar rights to the aborigines 
of the New World.  Id.  See also FALKOWSKI, supra note 146, at 22 (“Victoria rejected 
the arguments that Indians were precluded from being true owners by reason of un-
belief, heresy, unsoundness of mind, or any other mortal sin.”); NATIVE RIGHTS IN 
CANADA 14 (Peter A. Cumming & Neil H. Mickenberg eds., 2d ed. 1972) (“The Indi-
ans’ lack of belief in the Roman Catholic faith could not affect the question, as 
heretics in Europe were not denied property rights.”).  Luis De Molina (1535–1600) 
agreed with Victoria, contending there is nothing “to hinder infidels being masters 
of their own things and possessing things as private persons.”  HAMILTON, supra note 
142, at 120. 
 149 Green, supra note 138, at 39. 
 150 Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 73.  See 
also John Fredericks III,  America’s First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of Ameri-
can Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 347, 354 (1999) (“Victoria argued that the 
indigenous people of America possessed natural legal rights as free and rational 
people and had inherent rights under natural law to the territory they occupied.”); 
Friedberg, supra note 139, at 105 (“Central to Vitoria’s philosophy, which he derived 
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In addition to denying that title to lands in the New World could 
be claimed by papal grant, Vitoria rejected the notion that “mere dis-
covery” could vest title in situations where the territory discovered was 
already inhabited: 
[T]here is another title which can be set up, namely, by right of 
discovery; and no other title was originally set up, and it was in vir-
tue of this title alone that Columbus the Genoan first set sail.  And 
this seems to be an adequate title because those regions which are 
deserted become, by the law of nations and the natural law, the 
property of the first occupant (Inst., 2, I, 12). . . .  
 Not much, however, need be said about this third title of ours, 
because, as proved above, the barbarians were true owners, both 
from the public and from the private standpoint.  Now the rule of 
the law of nations is that what belongs to nobody is granted to the 
first occupant, as is expressly laid down in the aforementioned 
passage of the Institutes.  And so, as the object in question was not 
without an owner, it does not fall under the title which we are dis-
cussing. . . . [This title by discovery] in and by itself . . . gives no support 
to a seizure of the aborigines any more than if it had been they who had 
discovered us.151
Interestingly, while Vitoria rejected patent and discovery as legitimate 
bases for title to the New World, he did not discuss purchase.  This 
omission may be due to his focus on the circumstances in which 
from the humanistic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, was that ‘certain basic rights 
inhere in men as men . . . by reason of their humanity.’”).  Robert Williams, Jr., states 
that Vitoria is “the first Spanish thinker to systematically apply Thomistic natural law 
theory to the relations between states,” and that Vitoria’s “Humanist argument on 
the legal equality of Indians and Europeans . . . is regarded as his most enduring con-
tribution to Western liberal Indian jurisprudence.”  Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status 
of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 68, 73. 
 151 Victoria, supra note 143, at 138–39 (emphasis added) (citing JUSTINIAN, 
INSTITUTES § 2.1.12 (535)).  See also FALKOWSKI, supra note 146, at 23 (“Victoria be-
lieved that only vacant land could be claimed by discovery, not land that was owned 
and occupied by Indians.”); GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 107; LINDLEY, supra note 141, 
at 12 (“Victoria . . . maintained that the continent of America upon its discovery was 
not territorium nullius because the Indians were the veritable owners, private and pub-
lic, of their lands; and the Spaniards acquired by their discovery no further title to 
the lands of the barbarians than would have accrued to the barbarians had they dis-
covered Spain.”); NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra note 148, at 14 (“Spain had no 
claim to the land through discovery, he said, because that notion only applied to un-
occupied lands.”); Green, supra note 138, at 41 (“Moreover, any claim based on 
discovery is also discounted, for one can only acquire title by discovery over what is 
unowned and, for [Vitoria], the Indians were true owners.”).  In Justinian’s Institutes, 
the sixth century Roman law treatise cited by Victoria, the principle was laid down 
that “natural reason admits the title of the first occupant to that which previously had 
no owner.”  Dickason, supra note 68, at 233 (quoting JUSTINIAN, supra, at § 2.1.12). 
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Spain could justly invade and subjugate aboriginal lands.152  Vitoria 
argued that Spain could obtain lawful title to Indian lands without 
purchase if Indians transgressed “the law of nations” by, for example, 
denying Spaniards the “right to travel into lands in question and to 
sojourn there,”153 preventing missionaries “from freely preaching the 
Gospel,”154 or precluding Spanish merchants from lawfully carrying 
on trade and “making their profit.”155  If the Indians breach their duty 
to give the Spaniards “a friendly hearing and not to repel them,” the 
Spaniards would be justified in “seizing the provinces and sovereignty 
of the natives, provided the seizure be without guile or fraud and they 
do not look for imaginary causes of war.”156  Almost as an after-
thought, Vitoria noted that “[a]lso, it is a universal rule of the law of 
nations that whatever is captured in war becomes the property of the 
conqueror . . . .”157
The influence of Vitoria on Spanish views of Indians and Indian 
land rights is debatable.  On one hand, Felix Cohen and others claim 
 152 Newcomb, supra note 39, at 316 n.84 (“While Francisco de Vitoria and other 
scholars did concede that infidels could possess property rights and dominion, nev-
ertheless, they put forth a number of rationales by which Christian nations had the 
right to invade and subjugate non-Christian lands.”). 
 153 Victoria, supra note 143, at 151. 
 154 Id. at 157. 
 155 Id. at 153.  See also LINDLEY, supra note 141, at 12 (“Victoria thought that, if the 
Indians hindered the preaching of the Gospel, or obstinately refused the Spaniards 
such natural rights as the right to trade with them, then the Spaniards, as a last re-
sort, had against the Indians all the rights of war, and might take possession of their 
lands.”). 
Vitoria also stated that “[i]t might . . . be maintained that in their own interests 
the sovereigns of Spain might undertake the administration of their country, . . . so 
long as this was clearly for their benefit.”  Victoria, supra note 143, at 161.  The twin 
notions of a trust duty towards native peoples, and plenary power over native sover-
eignty and resources, are controversial aspects of federal Indian law in the United 
States.  See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“From their very 
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal 
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises 
the duty of protection, and with it the power.”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Chief Justice John Marshall declaring the relation of Indian 
tribes to the United States “resembles that of a ward to his guardian”).  See generally 
Watson, supra note 122, at 450–56. 
 156 Victoria, supra note 143, at 156.  See also Green, supra note 138, at 42 (“Having 
more or less denied the validity of the basis normally put forward to assert the Span-
ish title over the Indians and their lands, Victoria proceeds to explain how such a 
title could be acquired, and it may well be considered that his contentions to this ef-
fect are self-seeking and hypocritical, possessing no more validity than those he 
rejects.”); Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 77 
(“Victoria was able to provide a secular, as opposed to theocentric, justification for 
Spanish colonial hegemony in the New World.”). 
 157 Victoria, supra note 143, at 155. 
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that the humanist approach ultimately held sway, pointing to the Pa-
pal Bull Sublimis Deus (1537), in which Pope Paul III echoed the 
position of Innocent IV by proclaiming that “the said Indians . . . are 
by no means to be deprived of . . . the possession of their property, 
even though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they 
may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy . . . the possession of 
their property . . . .”158  On the other hand, Max Savelle argues that 
Vitoria’s theories 
were almost completely ignored by the Spanish government in its 
colonial policy.  They also had little or no effect upon the practice 
of international relations relative to colonial possessions. . . .  
 In practice, the majority of the colonizing states did give a cer-
tain recognition to the title to new lands, however inchoate, 
achieved by a discovering state simply by reason of its discovery.159
The death of Vitoria in 1546 prevented him from participating 
in a historic debate over the nature of Indian rights, which took place 
four years later in Valladolid under the aegis of Charles V of Spain.160  
The two debaters were Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490–1573), a lay 
jurist and royal historiographer, and Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474–
1566), a Dominican who had considerable experience with native 
peoples.  Sepúlveda, like Vitoria, never traveled across the Atlantic, 
but unlike Vitoria, contended that Spaniards had the right to rule in 
the New World because Indians were incapable of governing them-
selves: 
Compare then those blessings enjoyed by Spaniards of prudence, 
genius, magnanimity, temperance, humanity, and religion with 
those of the little men (hombrecillos) in whom you will scarcely find 
even vestiges of humanity, who not only possess no science but 
who also lack letters and preserve no monument of their history 
except certain vague and obscure reminiscences of some things 
on certain paintings.  Neither do they have written laws, but bar-
 158 Cohen, supra note 147, at 45.  See also FALKOWSKI, supra note 146, at 24, 25 
(“Victoria’s ideas were given papal support by Pope Paul III . . . . Sublimis Deus . . . 
recognized the right of Indians to own land regardless of their race, religion, degree 
of civilization, or any other circumstance.”). 
 159 SAVELLE, supra note 134, at 199–200. 
 160 Dickason, supra note 68, at 203–04. 
Charles V ordered a moratorium on New World conquests, and the 
hearings were convened “to determine as far as they could whether the 
atrocities reported to him were true, and to recommend a suitable plan 
by which such evils might be avoided, so that the Indians might be re-
turned to their former freedom, and by which, at the same time, that 
New World, once it had been calmed by advantageous laws and careful 
instructions, might be governed in the future.” 
Id. 
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baric institutions and customs.  They do not even have private 
property.161
Las Casas did not disagree with Sepúlveda’s observations regarding 
Indians’ concepts of  property: “[t]hey neither possess nor desire to 
possess worldly wealth,”162 but vigorously contested the characteriza-
tion of Indians as “barbaric,” and rejected the argument that, since 
native peoples did not live in “civilized” society, they were incapable 
of enjoying legal rights of ownership.163  Las Casas, who spent most of 
the first half of the sixteenth century in the New World, instead ar-
gued that natural law applied to Indians as it did to all human 
beings.164
In contrast to Puritan New England, land ownership was initially 
accorded less importance by Spanish colonists, since “tribute and la-
bor were the preferred modes of economic control, and power was 
expressed at first in [the] encomienda.”165  The three principal meth-
ods by which Spaniards acquired land from Indians following the 
mid-sixteenth century were through purchase, royal grants, and 
forced usurpation.166  Natives could, and did, sell land to private indi-
viduals: 
 161 LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 
122 (Little, Brown & Co. 1965) (1949).  See also Dickason, supra note 68, at 204 (set-
ting forth Sepúlveda’s four main points).  According to Robert Williams, Jr., 
Columbus “originated the idea that the Indians lacked the conception of privately 
held property,” and “Amerigo Vespucci’s widely read ethnography on Indian cus-
toms . . . furthered these perceptions.”  Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the 
American Indian, supra note 131, at 81 n.358.  See also COLLIS, supra note 132, at 88 
(“Shortly before he eventually set sail back to Europe [Columbus] had this to say of 
the people of Hispaniola.  ‘These are the most loving people.  They do not covet.  
They love their neighbour as themselves.  They have the most gentle way of speaking.  
They have no greed whatsoever for the property of others.’”). 
 162 HANKE, supra note 161, at 11. 
 163 Timothy J. Christian, Introduction to THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD, 
at ix (L.C. Green & Olive P. Dickason eds., 1989). 
 164 Id. 
 165 CHARLES GIBSON, THE AZTECS UNDER SPANISH RULE: A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS 
OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO, 1519–1810, at 272 (1964).  Under the encomienda system, 
conquistadors (the encomenderos) were granted the towns of the indigenous people 
they conquered, and were able to tax these people and summon them for labor.  Al-
though the encomenderos were expected to provide safety for the people through an 
established military and teachings in Christianity, the encomienda usually involved en-
slavement of the local population.  The New Laws of 1542 were enacted to curb 
abuses of the encomienda system.  Id. at 58–97.  “After over a decade of willing partici-
pation in the activities of the conquistadors, Las Casas renounced his encomienda in 
1514 and took up the cause of Indian rights.”  FALKOWSKI, supra note 146, at 26. 
 166 Friedberg, supra note 139, at 97; GIBSON, supra note 165, at 274–75.  See also 
CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 154 (1966) (“The great haciendas of Spanish 
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[P]urchase from the Indian occupants or owners, was at first un-
derstood to be a legal preliminary to formal entitlement by 
colonial authorities, as outright usurpation in the absence of 
payment was not. . . . Official Spanish permission to purchase was 
sometimes granted, but purchase alone was ordinarily regarded as 
sufficient evidence of Spanish-Indian negotiation.167
Private purchases, however, were “readily liable to fraud,”168 and the 
Spanish Crown, like the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony, began to require that all purchases be made under judicial 
supervision.169  Royal ordinances of 1571 and 1572, revised in 1603, 
provided, among other things, for an investigation into whether the 
Indian seller was the proper owner and retained enough land to sup-
port himself; public notice of the proposed purchase for thirty days; 
and judicial authorization of the sale.170
In discussing Spain’s views on Indian land rights in Johnson v. 
McIntosh, Marshall acknowledged that “Spain did not rest her title 
solely on the grant of the Pope,” but stated that Spain instead “placed 
it on the rights given by discovery.”171  However, as Robert Williams, 
Jr. points out, Marshall’s understanding and application of the dis-
covery doctrine conflicted with views of Vitoria and Spain: 
Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion that European nations unani-
mously accepted the title by discovery doctrine was never 
accepted by Victoria as part of the Law of Nations . . . . At most, 
discovery may have been agreed on by European nations as vest-
ing in the discoverer “an exclusive or ‘preemptive’ entitlement to 
deal with the natives as against other European crowns.”. . .  Mar-
shall’s assertion that discovery vested exclusive title in the 
discoverer deviated from the accepted principles of the Law of 
America came into being through land grant, purchase, usurpation, accretion, 
merger, and economic competition.”). 
 167 GIBSON, supra note 165, at 274.  See also Friedberg, supra note 139, at 97 (noting 
that “the Crown did not require Spaniards to obtain official permission to purchase 
from the Crown.  As it became clear that purchase arrangements between Spaniards 
and Indians were susceptible to deceit, however, the Crown began to require that all 
purchases be made under judicial supervision.”). 
 168 GIBSON, supra note 165, at 274. 
 169 Friedberg, supra note 139, at 97. 
 170 Id.  See also United States v. Jose Juan Lucero, 1 N.M. (1 Gild.) 422 (N.M. Terr. 
1869) (noting that, as far back as 1571, “Indians were allowed to sell their real estate 
and personal property in the presence of the judge,” but that “[i]n 1642, under Phil-
lip IV of Spain, a total prohibition existed, and the Indians could not sell”). 
 171 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
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Nations, and probably was invented to solve expediently the diffi-
cult question raised in M’Intosh . . . .172
B. French Views of Indian Land Rights 
The Spaniards were unique with respect to the extent they re-
flected “on the morality or legality of what they were doing as they 
encountered the New World and its inhabitants.”173  French writers, 
such as Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592),174 Charles de Secondat, 
Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712–1778),175 wrote about the New World’s indigenous peoples, but 
 172 Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 71 
n.300 (quoting RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE 
ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 47 (1980)).  See also Fredericks, supra note 
150, at 354 (“Victoria’s writings, though persuasive to many, were in many ways at 
odds with the harshly stated law of discovery embraced by the Pope and England, 
and later the United States.”); Friedberg, supra note 139, at 89 (“Marshall’s conclu-
sion not only departed from Spain’s colonial policies, it also deviated from the 
humanistic philosophy of Francisco de Vitoria, which underlay both Spanish law and 
the international law of Marshall’s era.”). 
 173 MULDOON, supra note 129, at 4. 
 174 Montaigne was seventeen years old when Las Casas debated Sepúlveda at Val-
ladolid, and followed Las Casas in rejecting negative characterizations of Native 
Americans.  See WILLIAM M. HAMLIN, THE IMAGE OF AMERICA IN MONTAIGNE, SPENSER, 
AND SHAKESPEARE: RENAISSANCE ETHNOGRAPHY AND LITERARY REFLECTION 37–68 (1995); 
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 693 (Donald M. Frame trans. 1958) 
(“I am much afraid that we shall have very greatly hastened the decline and ruin of 
this new world by our contagion . . . . Most of the responses of these peoples and 
most of our dealings with them show that they were not at all behind us in natural 
brightness of mind and pertinence.”). 
 175 Montesquieu is cited twice by the defendants in Johnson v. McIntosh in the 
summary of their argument.  See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567 
(1823) (recounting the defendants’ assertion that “the uniform understanding and 
practice of European nations, and the settled law, as laid down by the tribunals of 
civilized states, denied the right of the Indians to be considered as independent 
communities, having a permanent property in the soil, capable of alienation to pri-
vate individuals.  They remain in a state of nature, and have never been admitted 
into the general society of nations.”) (citing MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DES LOIX, vol. I, bk. 
18, chs. 11–13).  Further, Marshall asserted, 
[i]t is a violation of the rights of others to exclude them from the use 
of what we do not want, and they have an occasion for.  Upon this 
principle the North American Indians could have acquired no proprie-
tary interest in the vast tracts of territory which they wandered over; 
and their right to the lands on which they hunted, could not be con-
sidered as superior to that which is acquired to the sea by fishing in it.  
The use in the one case, as well as the other, is not exclusive. 
Id. at 569–70 (citing MONTESQUIEU, supra).  In Volume I, Book XVIII, Ch. 12 (“Of the 
Law of Nations Amongst People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth”) of The Spirit of 
the Laws, published in 1748, Montesquieu observed that “[a]s these people . . . are 
not possessed of landed property, they have many things to regulate by the law of na-
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did not focus at length on the legitimacy of French claims to Indian 
lands.176  The Swiss diplomat and legal scholar Emeric de Vattel 
(1714–1767), while not French, wrote his 1758 classic treatise on the 
principles of natural law, Le Droit des Gens (Law of Nations), during a 
stay in France.177  Vattel, in contrast to Vitoria, believed that the doc-
trine of discovery applied not only to uninhabited land, but also to “a 
vast territory” such as the New World, “in which are to be found only 
wandering tribes whose small numbers can not populate the whole 
country.”178  Vattel found it “praiseworthy” that the Puritans and Wil-
liam Penn of Pennsylvania “bought from the savages the lands they 
wished to occupy,” but deemed such purchases legally unnecessary: 
[T]hese tribes can not take to themselves more land than they 
have need of or can inhabit and cultivate.  Their uncertain occu-
pancy of these vast regions can not be held as a real and lawful 
taking of possession; and when the Nations of Europe, which are 
too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have 
no special need of and are making no present and continuous use 
of, they may lawfully take possession of them and establish colo-
nies in them.179
tions, and but few to decide by the civil law.”  BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAWS 276 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1966). 
 176 Rousseau asserted that man in a state of nature does not know good and evil, 
and is guided by emotions and not by his mind.  He is associated with the term “no-
ble savage,” although he apparently never employed it.  See generally MAURICE WILLIAM 
CRANSTON, THE NOBLE SAVAGE: JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1754–1762 (1991). 
 177 ARNEIL, supra note 88, at 182 (“In France, Emeric de Vattel adopted Locke’s 
thesis on property for his own classic treatise on the principles of natural law.”). 
 178 3 EMERIC DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE 
[THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW] 85 (James Brown Scott 
ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916).  See also FALKOWSKI, supra note 
146, at 30. 
 179 VATTEL, supra note 178, at 85–86.  The Puritans (with the exception of Roger 
Williams) and William Penn did not believe that purchase was a necessary prerequi-
site to valid title to Indian lands, relying instead on grants by royal charter.  See also 
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 486 n.128 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) 
(“Vattel expressed the classical view, which influenced Chief Justice Marshall and 
other founders of American legal doctrine in this field.  The conflicting claims of 
European powers to lightly populated areas in the new world were to be resolved, in 
Vattel’s view, in accordance with the precept of natural law that no nations can ‘ex-
clusively appropriate to themselves more land than they have occasion for, or more 
than they are able to settle and cultivate.’”); KENT, supra note 92, at 493 (“Vattel did 
not place much value on the territorial rights of erratic races of people, who sparsely 
inhabited immense regions, and suffered them to remain a wilderness, because their 
occupation was war, and their subsistence drawn chiefly from the forest.”); 1 FRANCIS 
PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS 14 (1984) (“The supremacy of the cultivator over the hunter . . . 
was given legal expression in the writings of the eighteenth-century Swiss jurist Em-
merich de Vattel.”); Berman, supra note 40, at 639 (“The writings of Vattel 
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Although Vattel certainly impacted John Marshall’s conception 
of Indian land rights in America,180 there is nothing to indicate that 
Le Droit des Gens especially influenced French thinking, and, in any 
event, the eighteenth-century treatise came too late to affect the for-
mative views of France on Indian land rights. 
Official French exploration of the New World lagged some thirty 
years behind Spain, beginning in the reign of Francis I (1515–
1547).181  In 1524, by the authority of King Francis, the Florentine ex-
plorer Giovianni da Verrazzano sailed along the east coast of North 
America, from Florida to Cape Breton, but established no settle-
ments.182  As a Catholic ruler, Francis was restricted by the Inter 
Caetera; however, an opening was provided when Pope Clement VII 
was persuaded in October 1533 to reinterpret the Bull and limit its 
meaning.183  Shortly thereafter, Francis commissioned Jacques Cartier 
to “go to the New Lands” and discover “certain islands and lands, 
where it is said he should find rich quantities of gold and other rich 
things.”184  By 1540, Francis I challenged not just the scope of the Inter 
Caetera, but its legitimacy, asserting that popes had no power to dis-
tribute lands among kings and asking “to see Adam’s will to learn 
concerning land tenures, in particular, were consistent with European designs of 
empire and the later notions of ‘manifest destiny.’”); Dickason, supra note 68, at 239 
(“Vattel . . . wrote that nations were bound by natural law to cultivate the land, and 
those who ‘roamed’ rather than inhabiting their territories, thereby taking up more 
land than was their due, could be lawfully restricted within narrower territorial lim-
its.”); Norgren, supra note 43, at 88 n.88 (“The language of justification for the 
taking of Native American land drew upon Vattel and others who stressed the su-
premacy of the pastoral-agricultural life over that of the hunter-gathere[r] and who 
usually misunderstood or did not mention the Native Americans who created 
towns.”); von der Heydte, supra note 134, at 461 (“Vattel. . . [declared that] ‘naviga-
tors who are invested with a commission from their sovereigns and going on a voyage 
of discovery come across islands or other vast lands, have always taken possession 
thereof on behalf of their nation; and usually that title has been respected, provided 
it has been followed later by actual possession.’”). 
 180 Compare VATTEL, supra note 178, at 85 (noting that “if each Nation had desired 
from the beginning to appropriate to itself an extent of territory great enough for it 
to live merely by hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, the earth would not suf-
fice for a tenth part of the people who now inhabit it.”); with Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543, 590 (1823) (“But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country 
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the 
country a wilderness . . . .”). 
 181 R.J. KNECHT, FRANCIS I, at 328 (1982). 
 182 Id. at 329–30. 
 183 Id. at 333.  According to Clement VII, the Papal Bull Inter Caetera only applied 
to “known continents, not to territories subsequently discovered by other powers.”  
Id. 
 184 Id. 
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how he had partitioned the world.”185  Having rejected papal grants as 
a basis for a valid title, Francis also discounted discovery without set-
tlement, stating that “‘passing by and discovering with the eye was not 
taking possession.’”186
John Marshall states in Johnson v. McIntosh that France, like 
Spain, “founded her title to the vast territories she claimed in Amer-
ica on discovery”: 
However conciliatory her conduct to the natives may have been, 
she still asserted her right of dominion over a great extent of 
country not actually settled by Frenchmen, and her exclusive right 
to acquire and dispose of the soil which remained in the occupation of In-
dians.  Her monarch claimed all Canada and Acadie, as colonies 
of France, at a time when the French population was very incon-
siderable, and the Indians occupied almost the whole country.  
He also claimed Louisiana, comprehending the immense territo-
ries watered by the Mississippi, and the rivers which empty into it, 
by the title of discovery.187
By describing France’s title as the “exclusive right to acquire and dis-
pose of the soil which remained in the occupation of Indians,” 
Marshall clearly indicates that something remained to be acquired.  
Rather than obtaining an absolute and complete title by discovery, 
France at most claimed “an exclusive or ‘preemptive’ entitlement to 
deal with the natives as against other European crowns.”188  Rights of 
 185 Id.  See also MULDOON, supra note 129, at 35–36 (stating that “even a Catholic 
ruler, King Francis I of France, expressed doubts about the power of the pope to 
grant the newly found lands to Castile and Portugal and to exclude the rest of Chris-
tian Europe from entering them without permission.”); DESMOND SEWARD, PRINCE OF 
THE RENAISSANCE: THE GOLDEN LIFE OF FRANÇOIS I, at 177 (1973) (“It is said that when 
he heard of Pope Alexander VI’s apportioning the New World between the Kings of 
Spain and Portugal, François cried out, ‘The sun shines for me too—what clause is 
there in Adam’s will which cuts me off from a share?’”). 
 186 KNECHT, supra note 181, at 340.  See also SAVELLE, supra note 134, at 196 (ob-
serving that “title by mere discovery alone was soon found to be insufficient, and had 
to be completed by some other title, such as occupation, while the authority of the 
Pope to dispose of non-European lands and peoples was challenged, both by Protes-
tant countries such as England and by Catholic countries such as France, and both in 
theory and practice.”); Juricek, supra note 51, at 10 (observing that “northern pow-
ers, notably France, England, and the Dutch provinces . . . [contended] that 
‘discovery’ and ‘possession’ were not separate phenomena; rather, ‘possession’ was 
an inseparable part of ‘discovery.’. . . Simple priority counted for little, for unless vis-
ual discovery were quickly followed by legitimate possession, later explorers could 
begin the process of discovery anew.”); von der Heydte, supra note 134, at 458 (not-
ing that France and England “were inclined to deny the validity of symbolic 
annexation and laid stress upon the necessity of actual occupancy.”). 
 187 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574–75 (1823) (emphasis 
added). 
 188 BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 172, at 47. 
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preemption recognized by (European) international law certainly 
impacted Indian land rights—by limiting potential purchasers—but 
preemptive rights were rights to acquire Indian soil, not rights to In-
dian soil.  Moreover, such preemptive rights appear to only exclude 
“other European crowns,” leaving open—at least arguably—the pos-
sibility that private individuals could purchase Indian lands. 
Cartier’s exploration of Canada was followed by Samuel de 
Champlain’s establishment of a French settlement at Quebec at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, and by subsequent exploratory 
journeys in the Great Lakes region and Mississippi Valley by Father 
Jacques Marquette, Louis Jolliet, and Robert Cavalier, sieur de La 
Salle.  According to historian Francis Parkman, La Salle proclaimed 
at the mouth of the Mississippi River, on April 9, 1682, that 
I . . . do now take, in the name of his Majesty and of his successors 
to the crown, possession of this country of Louisiana, . . . and all 
the nations . . . within the extent of the said Louisiana, . . . upon 
the assurance we have had from the natives of these countries that 
we are the first Europeans who have descended or ascended the 
said river . . . .189
The proclamation was not accompanied by either a deed or bill of 
sale. 
In the years that followed, up to the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the 
French endeavored to join Canada and Louisiana by maintaining 
military outposts along the major river routes.190  The French focused 
on trade with the Indians in the Upper Mississippi and Ohio country, 
as opposed to settlement, and the Indians in general “found the 
Frenchmen less race-conscious and less covetous of Indian land.”191  
The natives were able to find a “middle ground” with the French in 
the pays d’en haut, or upper country, as noted by Richard White: 
[W]hereas exchanges between the French and the Algonquians 
had strengthened the connections between the two peoples, ex-
changes between the British and the Algonquians bred conflict.  
The French took wives from the Indians and produced children 
of mixed descent; the British took land and threatened the well-
 189 FRANCIS PARKMAN, LA SALLE AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE GREAT WEST 306–07 
(Charles Scribner’s Sons 1915) (1897). 
 190 HOWARD H. PECKHAM, THE COLONIAL WARS: 1689–1762, at 122 (1964). 
 191 James Roger Tootle, Anglo-Indian Relations in the Northern Theatre of the 
French and Indian War, 1748–1761, at 20 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Ohio State University) (on file with Ohio State University) (quoting WILLIAM T. 
HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS 17 (1961)).  See also CLARK WISSLER, INDIANS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 94 (1966) (arguing that French success with Indians “in the Upper Mississippi 
and Ohio country was chiefly because they did not form colonies and because they 
had a common enemy in the advancing English frontier”). 
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being of Algonquian children.  The French were friends and rela-
tives; the British often seemed enemies and thieves.192
There are relatively few instances of grants of Indian lands to 
Frenchmen, either in public or private capacity.193  A reputed transac-
tion, however, involved the Piankeshaw Indians—the tribe that sold 
the lands at issue in Johnson v. McIntosh.  In 1742, the Piankeshaw—by 
a deed or treaty that was subsequently lost—supposedly granted the 
French at Vincennes (Indiana) a large amount of land located “along 
the Wabash from the mouth of White River to Pointe Coupee, a dis-
tance of about seventy-five miles, and of equal width.”194  For the most 
part, however, French America was sparsely settled, concentrated 
along major rivers, and focused on trade.  Both France and England 
claimed the Ohio Valley, and the French attempted to bolster their 
claim in 1749 by sending an expedition down the Ohio River led by 
Pierre-Joseph Céleron, Sieur de Blainville.195  At several points during 
the journey, Céleron nailed to trees, or buried, lead plates on which 
French claims to the region were recorded.  The engraved inscription 
described 
the renewal of possession which we have taken of the said river 
Ohio and of all those that therein fall, and of all the lands on 
both sides as far as the sources of the said rivers, as enjoyed or 
ought to be enjoyed by the preceding kings of France and as they 
 192 RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE 
GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815, at 342 (1991).  According to White, “[t]he middle 
ground is the place in between: in between cultures, peoples, and in between em-
pires and the nonstate world of villages.”  Id. at x. 
 193 See W.J. Eccles, French Imperial Policy for the Great Lakes Basin, in THE SIXTY YEARS’ 
WAR FOR THE GREAT LAKES, 1754–1814, at 25 (David Curtis Skaggs & Larry L. Nelson 
eds., 2001) (observing that “some of those nations [in the Great Lakes region] made 
it plain to the French that they were on their lands only on sufferance.”); General 
Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada, Doctrine of Discovery & Terra Nullius, 
http://generalsynod.anglican.ca/gs2001/rr/presentations/terranullius.html (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2005) (stating that “the French regime never entered into any land 
treaties with Amerindian peoples.  It simply assumed sovereignty and title to the land 
in virtue of the doctrine of discovery.”).  But see DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA 
LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 31 
(2001) (describing early French purchases of land in Illinois). 
 194 1 JACOB PIATT DUNN, INDIANA AND INDIANANS 187 (1919).  See also JACOB PIATT 
DUNN, INDIANA: A REDEMPTION FROM SLAVERY 99 n.1 (1905) (“Pointe Coupée is the 
abrupt bend of the Wabash five miles below Merom [Indiana].  It was reckoned to be 
twelve leagues above Vincennes, and the mouth of White River was estimated to be 
an equal distance below.  The grant was intended to be twenty-four leagues square.”).  
According to Dunn, “[a]lthough this ancient writing was never found, there is little 
room to doubt that this grant was actually made.”  Id. at 100. 
 195 R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE OHIO FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 
1720–1830, at 36 (1996). 
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therein have maintained themselves by arms and by treaties, espe-
cially by those of Riswick, of Utrecht, and of Aix-la-Chapelle.196
The Indians and English, however, were not particularly impressed. 
C. Dutch and Swedish Views of Indian Land Rights 
The Netherlands based its claims to the New World not on dis-
covery, nor on royal or papal patents, but instead on purchase of 
native lands.  In terms of theory, scholar and lawyer Hugo Grotius 
(1583–1645) wrote two treatises in the seventeenth century that fur-
thered Dutch interests in freely navigating the open seas and settling 
the New World.  In 1608 he published, anonymously, Mare Liberum 
(Freedom of the Seas), in order to demonstrate “that the Dutch . . . 
have the right to sail to the East Indies.”197  At the same time, Grotius 
rejected claims to the New World based on grant or mere discovery: 
[D]iscovery per se gives no legal rights over things unless before 
the alleged discovery they were res nullius. . . . The Spanish writer 
Victoria . . . has the most certain warrant for his conclusion that 
Christians, whether of the laity or of the clergy, cannot deprive in-
fidels of their civil power and sovereignty merely on the ground 
that they are infidels . . . .  
     . . . Surely it is a heresy to believe that infidels are not masters 
of their own property; consequently, to take from them their pos-
sessions on account of their religious belief is no less theft and 
robbery than it would be in the case of Christians.198
Grotius thus concurred with Vitoria that “the doctrine of discov-
ery was applicable only to vacant land, and it was inapplicable to land 
occupied by Indians who ‘now have and always have had their own 
 196 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
610 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1855). 
 197 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 7 (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).  Grotius 
had been retained by the Dutch East India Company to justify the capture by its 
ships, in 1602, of a Portuguese galleon located in the straits of Malacca, and wrote 
Mare Liberum to refute the claims of Spain and Portugal to exclude other countries 
from the high seas.  Id. at vi–viii (introduction). 
 198 Id. at 13.  See also GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 114 (“Grotius proceeds to dispose 
of the claim that the Indies were res nullius, and he then demolishes with true Protes-
tant fervor the claim to right emanating from the papal bulls.”); LINDLEY, supra note 
141, at 13 (“Grotius followed Victoria in maintaining that the Spaniards had no right 
to take the Indians’ territory.”); MULDOON, supra note 129, at 29 (“Grotius composed 
the Mare liberum as part of an effort to deny the legitimacy, on the basis of Alexander 
VI’s bulls, of Castilian and Portuguese possession of the newly discovered lands.”); 
SAVELLE, supra note 134, at 202 (quoting Grotius as stating that “Infidels cannot be 
divested of public or private rights of ownership merely because they are infidels, 
whether on the ground of discovery, or in virtue of a papal grant, or on grounds of 
war.”). 
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kings, their own governments, their own lands, and their own legal 
systems.’”199  In 1625, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and 
Peace), Grotius reiterated that “discovery applies to those things 
which belong to no one,” and decried as “shameless” efforts to claim 
“by right of discovery what is held by another, even though the occu-
pant may be wicked, may hold wrong views about God, or may be dull 
of wit.”200  As to what may be lawfully occupied, Grotius enumerated 
places hitherto uncultivated and animals not yet possessed, such as 
uninhabited islands, wild beasts, fishes, and birds.201
In terms of actual practice, the first Dutch settlement was Fort 
Nassau at present-day Albany, New York.  In 1621 the Dutch West In-
dia Company (West-Indische Compagnie) was chartered and empowered 
to establish the colony of New Netherland.  The Protestant Dutch—
who could not rely on papal grants and lacked strong claims based on 
discovery—decided early on to purchase the lands they occupied 
from the Indians.  As William MacLeod points out, 
the Dutch . . . had little chance of sustaining a claim themselves 
on the basis of right of discovery, which the English at first rested 
their case on; or donation from the Pope, upon which the Span-
ish claim rested.  So they had to find something else.  They 
decided to argue, against the claims of Spanish and English, that 
the Indian tribes or nations were owners of the land—as of course 
 199 FALKOWSKI, supra note 146, at 29 (quoting GROTIUS, supra note 197, at 11).  See 
also Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 32, 
n.127 (“The early writers on international law, such as Franciscus de Victoria and 
Hugo Grotius, all agreed that mere discovery of aboriginally occupied territory could 
not vest a recognizable title in the discoverer.”). 
 200 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 550 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Classics of International Law ed. 1964).  Grotius did contend, however, that 
if within the territory of a people there is any deserted and unproduc-
tive soil, this also ought to be granted to foreigners if they ask for it.  Or 
it is right for foreigners even to take possession of such ground, for the 
reason that uncultivated land ought not to be considered as occupied 
except in respect to sovereignty, which remains unimpaired in favour 
of the original people. 
Id. at 202. 
 201 GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 115.  First-year law students are customarily intro-
duced to this concept by reading the famous case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1805), which held that mere pursuit of a wild animal (e.g., a fox) without 
reduction to possession gave no legal property right to the pursuer.  In the textbook 
I use, Pierson v. Post is the second case presented to students, preceded only by John-
son v. McIntosh.  See SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, 
MICHAEL BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW:  CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1–23 (2d ed. 
1998).  Interestingly, Henry Brockholst Livingston, who—just prior to his death—
joined in the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh, served as a 
New York state judge prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice, and as such dis-
sented in Pierson v. Post. 
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they were.  This title could be obtained from the natives, they 
contended, only by conquest, or by gift or purchase.202
Thus, the records of the Dutch West India Company show that 
patents issued to Dutch settlers “conferred the ultimate right of own-
ership only after the grantees had first acquired title by individual 
purchase directly from the Indians.”203  The most famous Indian sale 
of land to the Dutch took place in 1626, when Peter Minuit, director 
general of the Dutch West India Company, purchased Manhattan Is-
land for goods valued at twenty-four dollars.204  Three years later, the 
 202 MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 195.  See also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: 
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 259 (1965) (“The Dutch in North America, compared to 
the English, had only a flimsy ‘right of discovery’; . . . they had to find or build other 
legal foundations, and they therefore began the practice of ‘buying’ their lands from 
the Indians.”); Berman, supra note 40, at 653 (“The Dutch bolstered their claims to 
New Netherlands with formal agreements of purchase from the Indian nations.  
They argued against the Spanish and the English that the Indian nations were the 
owners of the land, and that title must be acquired by a purchase or grant from the 
natives.”); Newcomb, supra note 39, at 318 (“The Dutch rationalized their moving 
into areas in North America already discovered by the British Crown by arguing that 
no monarch ‘could “prevent the subjects of another to trade in countries whereof his 
people have not taken, nor obtained actual possession from the right owners, either 
by contract or purchase.”’”) (quoting FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: 
INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF THE CONQUEST 133 (1975)) (quoting West 
Indian Company to States General, May 5, 1632, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE 
TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 52 (AMS Press 1969) (1856)). 
 203 1 FRANCIS BAZLEY LEE, NEW JERSEY: AS A COLONY AND AS A STATE 107 (1902) 
(“This policy of purchase, instituted by the Dutch and adopted by the Quakers, was a 
recognition that the Indian had rights of life, liberty, opinion, and property.”); 
MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 194 (“In 1626 the West India Company instructed its New 
Netherlands agents formally to acquire title to lands from the Indians by purchase.”); 
GEORGIANA C. NAMMACK, FRAUD, POLITICS, AND THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE INDIANS 5 
(1969).  See also Jennings, supra note 68, at 110 (explaining that “when the Dutch 
West India Company settled New Netherlands in 1625, the company instructed its 
resident Director that Indian claims to land should be extinguished by persuasion or 
purchase, ‘a contract being made thereof and signed by them [the Indians] in their 
manner, since such contracts upon other occasions may be very useful to the Company.’” (in-
ternal citations omitted)). 
 204 BOORSTIN, supra note 202, at 259 (“In 1626, Peter Minuet, in charge of the 
Dutch settlement on Manhattan Island, paid the Indians sixty gulden for that twenty-
thousand acre tract of woodland.”); LEE, supra note 203, at 107  (“Peter Minuit, in 
1626, for the value of twenty-four dollars, secured the Indian title to Manhattan Is-
land.”); MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 194 (“This first purchase was that of the island of 
Manhattan, now the site of much of New York City, then a twenty thousand acre tract 
of woodland.  The price paid was goods valued at sixty gulden, the equivalent of 
twenty-four dollars in United States money of to-day but, in the then purchasing 
power of money, worth perhaps about the equivalent of two thousand dollars to-
day.”); Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of In-
dian Country in the Twenty-first Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 435 (1998) (describing 
the “familiar painting of the Canarsie Indians’ bargain in 1626 that transferred Man-
hattan Island to Peter Minuet, Director of the Dutch West Indian Company, for 
twenty-four dollars in Indian trade goods, trinkets, and rum.”).  See also Jennings, su-
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laws of the Colony of New Netherland expressly provided that “[t]he 
Patroons of New Netherlands, shall be bound to purchase from the 
Lords Sachems in New Netherland, the soil where they propose to 
plant their colonies, and shall acquire such right thereunto as they 
will agree for with the said Sachems.”205  In light of these early and 
consistent practices, the Dutch have been given “the credit for estab-
lishing the principle of purchasing Indian title to land” in North 
America.206
The policy of the Swedes was similar to that of the Dutch, and 
was set forth in the “Instructions to Governor Johan Printz,” written 
in Stockholm and dated August 15, 1642.  The Governor of New 
Sweden was instructed to “bear in mind that the wild inhabitants of 
the country” are “its rightful lords.”207  Accordingly, the Swedes—who 
also could not rely on papal grants and who had even weaker claims 
based on discovery than the Dutch—determined to purchase the 
lands they occupied from the Indians.208  In 1638, Swedish settlers es-
tablished Fort Christina (present-day Wilmington, Delaware), New 
Sweden’s first permanent settlement, by acquiring land from the Le-
nape Indians.209  In 1655, the colony was lost to the Dutch,210 who 
surrendered it to the English in 1664.211
D. Early English and Colonial Views of Indian Land Rights 
Henry VII, who founded the Tudor dynasty and reigned from 
1485 to 1509, was “a pious son of the Church, obedient to its decree 
pra note 68, at 110 (“On June 8, 1633, the New Netherland Dutch purchased a tract 
of land for a trading post where Hartford, Conn., now stands.”). 
 205 Cohen, supra note 147, at 39–40 (citing New Project of Freedoms and Exemp-
tion, Article 27, reprinted in CHARLES C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 577 (1900)). 
 206 LEE, supra note 203, at 119. 
 207 C. HALE SIPE, THE INDIAN WARS OF PENNSYLVANIA 62 (photo. reprint 2000) 
(1929). 
 208 Id. at 65 (“Dr. William Reynolds, in the introduction to his translation of Acre-
lius’ ‘History of New Sweden,’ emphasizes a great historical truth when he says: ‘The 
Swedes inaugurated the policy of William Penn, for which he has been deservedly 
praised, in his purchase of the soil from the Indians.’”). 
 209 Margareta Revera, The Making of a Civilized Nation: Nation-Building, Aristocratic 
Culture, and Social Change, in NEW SWEDEN IN AMERICA 25, 31 (Carol E. Hoffecker et al. 
eds., 1995). 
 210 CAROL E. HOFFECKER, DELAWARE, THE FIRST STATE 34 (1988). 
 211 BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THESE DARING DISTURBERS OF THE PUBLIC PEACE: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR PROPERTY AND POWER IN EARLY NEW JERSEY 12 (1999). 
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in any matter of religion.”212  The exploration of the New World, 
however, was a different issue.  At first, King Henry recognized the 
rights of Spain and Portugal in the southern seas, but took the posi-
tion that “adventurers could reach the Indies by following a route to 
the north of that taken by Columbus.”213  On March 5, 1496, by royal 
patent, John Cabot and his sons were authorized 
to find, discover and investigate whatsoever islands, countries, re-
gions or provinces of heathens and infidels . . . which before this 
time were unknown to all Christians. . . . And that the before-
mentioned John and his sons or their heirs and deputies may 
conquer, occupy and possess whatsoever such towns, castles, cities 
and islands by them thus discovered . . ., acquiring for us the do-
minion, title and jurisdiction of the same towns, castles, cities, 
islands and mainlands so discovered; . . .214
 212 JAMES A. WILLIAMSON, THE CABOT VOYAGES AND BRISTOL DISCOVERY UNDER 
HENRY VII, at 52 (Cambridge 1962) (1961).  However, “[i]n political matters [Henry 
VII] did not admit the right of the Pope to order his decisions.”  Id. 
There is some evidence that England had in the past acknowledged the author-
ity of the pope to grant title to lands.  John of Salisbury, afterwards bishop of 
Chartres, wrote in 1159 that Pope Adrian IV (1154–1159)—the only Englishman to 
occupy the papal chair—had by the bull Laudabiliter “‘granted and given Ireland to 
the illustrious Henry II king of the English to be held by hereditary right. . . .’”  Anne 
J. Duggan, Totius christianitatis caput.  The Pope and the Princes, in ADRIAN IV: THE 
ENGLISH POPE (1154–1159), at 141 (Brenda Bolton & Anne J. Duggan eds., 2003) 
(quoting IOANNIS SARES BERIENSIS, METALOGICON 183 (J.B. Hall & K.S.B. Keats-Rohan 
eds., 1991)).  English authorities relied upon this alleged papal grant as the basic le-
gal justification of their sovereignty over Ireland.  See id. at 139 (“Laudabiliter was 
cited, on both sides of the political divide, as the ‘title-deed’ of the English crown’s 
authority over Ireland”); GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 50.  Anne Duggan, however, 
states that “there is considerable doubt about its status and authenticity,” and that, in 
any event, “there is nothing . . . in Laudabiliter . . . that [can] properly be seen as a 
‘grant.’”  Duggan, supra, at 141. 
 213 J.D. MACKIE, THE EARLIER TUDORS, 1485–1558, at 226 (1966).  See also S.B. 
CHRIMES, HENRY VII, at 229 (1972) (“Henry VII would respect Spanish rights to what 
Spain had already discovered, but was willing enough for enterprises under his pa-
tronage to stake a claim in any lands westward newly discovered. . . .”); WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 212, at 51 (“[H]e would not recognize in advance any Spanish right to 
prospective discoveries not yet accomplished: if the English could get first into these 
prospective regions, theirs was to be the right in them.”). 
 214 WILLIAMSON, supra note 212, at 204–05.  See also GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 100 
(“In the first patent given to John Cabot, issued under circumstances similar to those 
existing at the time of Columbus’ first voyage, we find language strikingly like that in 
the patent of Columbus.  Cabot is given authority to seek out, discover and find new 
islands and lands, and to conquer, occupy and possess them.”); Newcomb, supra note 
39, at 314 (noting that “[the] English charters giving the Cabots and other grantees 
the authority to possess non-Christian lands . . . expressed religious rather than secu-
lar distinctions between Christians and indigenous nations, and assumed that the 
Christians possessed a right to subjugate heathens and infidels and appropriate their 
lands.”).  John Cabot (Giovanni Caboto) was born in Genoa and later became a Ve-
netian citizen.  He came to England some time between 1484 and 1490.  CHRIMES, 
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The precise location of Cabot’s landfall, in 1497, is not known, 
and has been variously assigned to the Labrador coast, the New-
foundland area, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, or Maine.  In 
Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall goes so far as to claim that Cabot “dis-
covered the continent of North America, along which he sailed as far 
south as Virginia.”215  In any event, when the Spanish ambassador to 
England learned that a second voyage was authorized, he protested 
(to no avail) that the land Henry was in search of “was already in the 
possession of the King of Spain.”216  It became a moot point for the 
time being, as John Cabot did not return from his trip to America. 
Other explorations authorized by King Henry were of less con-
sequence.  However, in his royal patent of December 9, 1502, the 
explorers were barred not simply from lands known to Christians, but 
from lands first discovered by the King of Portugal or other friendly 
princes and now in their possession.”217  By such language, England ac-
corded even less respect to the papal grants: the pretensions of the 
Spanish and Portugese to the New World were defensible “only in so 
far as these claims were supported by actual possession.”218
Henry VII’s Protestant granddaughter, Elizabeth I, who reigned 
from 1558 until 1603, also actively endorsed this concept of effective 
occupation.  She authorized Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in 1578, to “hold, 
occupy, and enjoy” countries “not actually possessed of any Christian 
prince or people”;219 and in 1584 likewise commanded Gilbert’s half-
brother, Sir Walter Raleigh, to discover and occupy “such remote, 
heathen and barbarous lands, countries, and territories, not actually 
possessed of any Christian Prince, nor inhabited by Christian Peo-
ple.”220  Most famously, in reply to the Spanish ambassador Mendoza, 
supra note 213, at 228; DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 5.  It is 
possible that Henry was unaware of the existence of the Inter Caetera when he author-
ized Cabot’s exploration in 1496.  See WILLIAMSON, supra note 212, at 52 (“How far 
such bulls were published seems to be an unsettled question.”). 
 215 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 576 (1823).  Marshall goes on to 
say, with respect to John Cabot’s voyage, that it is “[t]o this discovery the English 
trace their title.”  Id. 
 216 GLADYS TEMPERLEY, HENRY VII, at 321 (Greenwood Press 1971) (1914). 
 217 WILLIAMSON, supra note 212, at 133. 
 218 GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 58–59.  See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 212, at 132 
(“So early does the doctrine of effective occupation make its appearance on the co-
lonial scene.”). 
 219 GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 101. 
 220 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 6; W. Stitt Robinson, Con-
flicting Views on Landholding: Lord Baltimore and the Experiences of Colonial Maryland With 
Native Americans, 83 MD. HIST. MAG. 85, 86 (1988).  See also GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 
102 (“The English crown, far from asserting a right to territory by discovery, seems to 
have laid great stress upon the fact of possession.”); Juricek, supra note 51, at 12 
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who complained of Sir Francis Drake’s circumnavigation, Queen 
Elizabeth unequivocally rejected the notion of title by virtue of papal 
grant, and further stated that “she would not persuade herself that 
the Indies are the rightful property of Spain . . . only on the ground 
that the Spaniards have touched here and there, have erected shel-
ters, have given names to a river or promontory, acts which cannot 
confer property.”221
Although England rejected titles based on papal grants and 
mere discovery, Elizabeth’s successors increasingly relied on royal 
grants, as John Juricek points out: 
Englishmen began to contend that the king himself could take 
possession of overseas territories through the medium of royal 
charters. . . .  
 . . . The rationale behind English territorial claims thus became 
almost indistinguishable from that long maintained by the Iberian 
powers, though the English tended to emphasize discovery less 
and possession more. . . .  
 . . . The accession of a new dynasty in 1603 is certainly part  
of the explanation for the change in the English rationale for  
territorial appropriation.  The early Stuarts were notoriously  
more receptive to legal doctrines which magnified royal  
authority . . . .222
King James I, who reigned from 1603 to 1625 chartered the Virginia 
Company of London on April 10, 1606, granting the Company’s pro-
prietors “license to make habitation, plantation, and to deduce a 
colony of sundry of our people into that part of America, commonly 
(“The contemporary European consensus was that discovery conferred upon the dis-
covering power a temporary preferential right to acquire such title, not title itself.”) 
Juricek notes that Robert Johnson, in his Nova Britannia (1609), acknowledged the 
earlier discoveries of the Cabots, but stressed instead that English claims to America 
were grounded on the “more late Discoverie and actuall possession, taken in the 
name and right of Queen Elizabeth, in Anno 1584.” Id. at 19. 
Gilbert sailed to Newfoundland in 1583 and disappeared at sea on his return 
voyage.  Raleigh (or Ralegh) founded the ill-fated colony at Roanoke three years 
later in the territory later known as Virginia. 
 221 von der Heydte, supra note 134, at 458–59.  See also Williams, Jr., Origins of the 
Status of the American Indian, supra note 131, at 35 n.142  (“By 1580, the English 
Crown . . . adopted an explicit policy of challenging Spanish territorial claims based 
solely on papal donation, insisting that only effective Spanish occupation of claimed 
territory could perfect a recognizable title.”). 
 222 Juricek, supra note 51, at 21–22.  See also Muldoon, supra note 98, at 35 (“When 
we turn to the English in the New World, we find royal charters that parallel the pa-
pal bulls.  Where the pope had granted authorization for exploration and conquest, 
the English monarchs now provided the sanction.  In doing this, English monarchs 
were asserting jurisdiction derived from their role as Supreme Head of the Church of 
England.”). 
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called Virginia . . . not now actually possessed by any Christian prince 
or people.”223  As a proponent of the divine right theory of monarchy, 
James “relied on his personal authority . . . to grant letters patent to 
the Virginia Companies of London and Plymouth.”224  This charter 
was followed, three years later, by a more definite grant “in absolute 
property” of the lands known as Virginia.225  The new charter, issued 
in May 1609 to “The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and 
Planters of the City of London for the First Colony of Virginia,” is di-
rectly relevant to the Illinois-Wabash land purchase, since its “Sea to 
Sea” grant arguably encompassed the lands purchased from the Illi-
nois and Piankeshaw Indians in 1773 and 1775: 
 And we do also . . . give, grant and confirm . . . all those Lands, 
Countries, and Territories, situate, lying, and being, in that Part 
of America called Virginia, from the Point of Land, called Cape or 
Point Comfort, all along the Sea Coast, to the Northward two hun-
dred Miles, and from the said Point of Cape Comfort, all along the 
Sea Coast, to the Southward two hundred Miles, and all that 
Space and Circuit of Land, lying from the Sea Coast of the Pre-
cinct aforesaid, up into the Land, throughout from Sea to Sea, 
West, and Northwest; . . . .226
 223 Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy, supra note 122, at 69 (quoting 1 SAMUEL ELLIOT 
MORISON, ADMIRAL OF THE OCEAN SEA 8 (1942)).  “The sponsors of this enterprise 
were closely connected to the circle that had supported Raleigh’s colonizing activities 
two decades earlier.”  OBERG, supra note 62, at 50.  “The charter . . . provided for the 
incorporation of two companies: the London Company and the Plymouth Company.  
It was the London Company that established the first permanent English colony in 
America; the expedition of one hundred and twenty settlers who . . . planted a colony 
at Jamestown May 14[, 1607].”  DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 8.  
The territory granted was “between 34º and 45º north latitude; that is, all the land 
from the Passamaquoddy Bay in Maine to the Cape Fear River in North Carolina, ex-
tending westward to the Pacific Ocean.”  WARREN M. BILLINGS ET AL., COLONIAL 
VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 15 (Milton M. Klein & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1986). 
 224 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 11 (1992).  Hof-
fer argues that the 1606 charter “thus combined remnants of feudal vassalage and 
harbingers of nascent capitalism,” and that each Stuart charter “reflected a private 
transaction between the king, acting in his person as the owner of all land in the New 
World, and the company board of directors.”  Id. at 11, 13. 
 225 Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian, supra note 51, at 762 (“Three 
years later, a new and enlarged charter granted a portion of the grantees ‘in absolute 
property’ the lands later comprising Virginia.”). 
 226 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 11.  See also Herbert B. Ad-
ams, Maryland’s Influence on Land Cessions to the United States, 3 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. 
STUDIES IN HIST. & POL. SCIENCES 10, 11 (1885) (describing the “extraordinary ambi-
guity” of the 1609 grant, and setting forth both the expansive “wedge” interpretation 
and the more restrictive “triangle” interpretation); Juricek, supra note 51, at 13–14 
(“This patent contains the first grant of American territory from an English monarch 
to a colonizing agency, and this grant embodies the first more or less definite English 
claim in North America.  But what exactly was granted here presents numerous prob-
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Virginia became a royal province in 1624 upon the dissolution of 
the London Company; however, the boundaries first set forth in the 
1609 charter remained.227  Such grants of land from “Sea to Sea,” ul-
timately made to seven of the thirteen colonies (Connecticut, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia), were “vast preemptive claims” designed to thwart the 
ambitions of other European powers, particularly Spain and 
France.228
lems of interpretation. . . . Virginians later maintained that King James here in-
tended to convey a gigantic 45º wedge of the continent, and this opinion has been 
endorsed by some modern scholars.”). 
The 1609 charter separated the London and Plymouth companies, replaced the 
royal council with a company council, and vested control of the colony in the treas-
urer and his council.  DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 10.  See also 
BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 223, at 37 (noting that “the London Company . . . by the 
winter of 1608–09, . . . undertook a review of their operation with an eye toward mak-
ing it pay.  Their reexamination led to a fundamental overhaul of the company, the 
provisions for which were embodied in a new charter which James I granted early in 
1609.”); 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789: 
VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND LAWS, at 1 (Alden T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds., 
1998) [hereinafter 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS] (noting that the 1609 
charter “vested control of the colony in the London Company”); MARSHALL, supra 
note 1, at 43 (“Some of the first nobility and gentry of the country, and most of the 
companies of London, with a numerous body of merchants and tradesmen, were 
now added to the former adventurers.”). 
 227 See Adams, supra note 226, at 11 (“No alteration appears to have been made at 
that time in the boundaries established by the charter of 1609, but the northern lim-
its of Virginia were afterwards curtailed by grants to Lord Baltimore (1632) and 
William Penn (1681), and the southern limits by a grant to the proprietors of Caro-
lina (1663).”).  A third charter issued by King James in 1612 had consolidated local 
power in a governor appointed by the London Company.  15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 226, at 1.  “After Virginia became a royal colony in 1624, the 
governor and council represented the crown rather than the defunct Virginia Com-
pany.”  Id. at 2.  See also THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY WITH 
STATISTICS 33 (photo. reprint 1970) (1884) (“In 1625, May 13, Charles I. was 
crowned, and in the same year he issued a royal proclamation for a commission to 
govern Virginia, alleging judicial repeal of the charters and transformed the colony 
into a royal province.  After this, the chartered limits of the colony were reduced by 
including successive portions of it in other colonies.”); L.J. Priestley, Communal Native 
Title and the Common Law: Further Thoughts on the Gove Land Rights Case, 6 FED. L. REV. 
150, 153–54 (1974) (Austl.) (stating that “the London Company . . . conducted the 
affairs of the colony until 1624 when the Crown took direct control into its own 
hands.  The Company at all times acted on the basis that it had the right of absolute 
disposition of the land.”). 
 228 Juricek, supra note 51, at 22 (“Over the next century and more the English 
continued to make vast preemptive claims in North America.”).  See also B.A. Hins-
dale, The Right of Discovery, 2 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. PUBLICATIONS 335, 359 
(1888) (“It has been common to explain the grants of land extending from ocean to 
ocean, made . . . to certain of the English colonies, by referring them to ignorance of 
geography; but a committee of the Continental Congress, reporting on the claims of 
the United States, August 16, 1782, suggested that their majesties’ ‘principal object at 
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Tracing the title of lands in North America to royal grants—
whether open-ended or not—presumably cohered with the “funda-
mental principle in the English law, derived from the maxims of the 
feudal tenures, that the king was the original proprietor . . . and the 
true and only source of title.”229  The feudal system originated in me-
dieval Europe and was predicated on the theory that “all the known 
property of the world was vested in an overlord, and that the domin-
ion over it was exercised by him either mediately or immediately.”230  
Consequently, property rights “were privileges bestowed on an indi-
vidual by his sovereign.”231  In return, those who held property “of the 
king” were required to perform services, economic or otherwise.232  In 
that time was to acquire by that of occupancy which originated in this western world, 
to-wit, by charters, a title of the lands comprehended therein against foreign pow-
ers.’”) (quoting SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS, III, at 
177 (Boston, 1821)). 
 229 KENT, supra note 92, at 481.  See also Muldoon, supra note 98, at 36 (“One 
might also ask why the English monarchs bothered with charters at all.  Why not 
simply take what lands were available and forget about formal justification of the ac-
tion?  The obvious reason is that, by the sixteenth century, possession of property 
clearly required a formal, written record.  If the English were to occupy part of North 
America, they would need a title deed.”). 
 230 GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 64.  See also Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the 
Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 507, 516 (2003) (“Feudalism is ‘a 
vague and general word describing the social structure of Western Europe from the 
tenth century onwards.’  In England, feudalism signifies variously a form of govern-
ment, a military system, a social organization, and a pattern of land ownership.  As a 
system of land ownership, it is a pyramid with the king at the top beholden to no 
one, layers of lords in the middle beholden to their superiors, and serfs at the bot-
tom beholden to everyone.”). 
In early English history, conveyancing was accomplished by feoffment by livery of 
seisin, whereby the transferor (feoffor) orally proclaimed the transfer of the land to 
the transferee (feoffee), and “handed over a twig or clump of earth to symbolize the 
conveyance.”  WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 807 
(3d ed. 2000).  English explorers carried this legal concept to the New World: 
In 1583, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in the first English effort at New World 
settlement, at St. John’s Harbor, gathered together the Portuguese, 
French, and English merchants and shipmasters trading and fishing off 
the banks of Newfoundland and informed them of his written authori-
zation to possess the territory for England.  He then “had delivered 
unto him (after the custom of England) a rod [small twig] and a turf of 
the same soil.” 
Seed, supra note 139, at 20–21.  Almost two hundred years later, Richard Henderson 
of North Carolina, when he purchased a large portion of present-day Kentucky in 
1775 directly from the Cherokee Indians, likewise employed the ceremony of feoff-
ment by livery of seisin, taking “possession of a bit of Kentucky turf in a moment of 
feudal pageantry.”  JOHN MACK FARAGHER, DANIEL BOONE: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF AN 
AMERICAN PIONEER 124 (1992). 
 231 WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF 
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (1977). 
 232 Id. at 5, 9. 
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the seventeenth century, land in British America was typically granted 
by royal charter in “‘free and common socage,’” which required the 
payment of “quit-rents,” the annual rent that feudal law required an 
inferior to pay his superior.233  Quit-rents, which can be seen as a land 
tax paid to the Crown, were often not collected.234  However, as Bev-
erley Bond points out, “[t]he supreme importance of the quit-rent 
system in the American colonies arises from its significance as a 
means of asserting the feudal position of the crown.”235  Indeed, both 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, in their pre-Revolution publica-
tions, took issue with the feudal position of the crown by denying—or 
decrying—the transferral of British feudalism to America.236
In any event, the royal charters which granted lands “in free and 
common socage” were silent as to Indian rights in the lands granted.  
Nathan Dane, in his General Abridgment and Digest of American Law, 
published a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. 
McIntosh, declared without equivocation that “[e]very Englishman 
who came to America viewed his English patent as giving him the le-
gal title to the land; and he settled with the Indians as of 
convenience, of equity, or humanity, and not as a matter in law essen-
tial to his title.”237  Dane’s sweeping statement is incorrect, as 
evidenced by the debate with, and banishment of, Roger Williams in 
New England.  But neither the Tudors nor the Stuarts ever suggested 
that the necessary—or even appropriate—course of action would be 
for the English to buy America from the Indians.  As Patricia Seed 
noted: 
 233 Id. at 6, 13. 
 234 See id. at 13; CRONON, supra note 58, at 71; HOFFER, supra note 224, at 11; JACK 
M. SOSIN, THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER, 1763–1783, at 25 (1967); Jack M. Sosin, 
Britain and the Ohio Valley, 1760–1775: The Search for Alternatives in a Revolutionary Era, 
in CONTEST FOR EMPIRE, 1550–1775, at 65 (John B. Elliott ed., 1975); James Warren 
Springer, American Indians and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New England, 30 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 25, 28 (1986). 
 235 BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., THE QUIT-RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 439 
(Yale Univ. Press 1965) (1919).  See also MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 26 (“Lands were 
to be holden within the colony, as the same estates were enjoyed in England.”); Mat-
thew Aaron Zimmerman, A Flicker in the Light: William Penn’s Motivations For a 
Peaceful Indian Policy, 1681–1718, at 60 (June 1999) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Ohio 
State University) (on file with Ohio State University) (“By European tradition, land 
in North America belonged to the king, and he exclusively held the right to dispense 
it.”). 
 236 See JOHN ADAMS & JONATHAN SEWALL, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS; OR 
POLITICAL ESSAYS PUBLISHED IN THE YEARS 1774 AND 1775, at 94–116 (photo. reprint 
1968) (1819); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 
27–28 (photo. reprint 1971) (1774). 
 237 4 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 69 
(1824). 
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 By what right did Elizabeth I authorize Gilbert and Ralegh to 
“have, hold, occupy and enjoy” with the additional “full power to 
dispose thereof . . . according to . . . the lawes of England” territo-
ries that she did not actually own?  The patent lays out two 
“reasons” (or rationalizations) justifying English dominion over 
the New World: the authority of the crown and the eminent do-
main of Christian princes.   
 The authority invoked by Elizabeth originated first . . . from her 
own “especial grace, certaine science, and mere motion.”  “Espe-
cial grace” designated the source of royal authority in medieval 
English thinking—the idea that royal authority derives from God 
and comes to the crown by grace. . . .  
 . . . The second source of the queen’s authority is the absence of 
dominion over the lands by any other Christian ruler.238
The English charters, with the exception of the Rhode Island char-
ters, tacitly deny the property rights of the Indians.  King James’ 1606 
charter, “although granting away two vast areas of territory greater 
than England, inhabited by thousands of Indians, a fact of which the 
King had knowledge both officially and unofficially, do[es] not con-
tain therein the slightest allusion to them.”239  The Pennsylvania 
charter of 1681, which described the “commendable desire” of Wil-
liam Penn “to reduce the Savage Natives by gentle and just manners 
to the love of civill Societie and Christian Religion,” nevertheless as-
sumed the right of Charles II to make “the said William Penn, his 
heires and Assignes, . . . the true and absolute Proprietaries of the Coun-
trey aforesaid,” along with “full and absolute power . . . [to] assigne, 
alien, Grant, demise or infeoffe of the premisses . . . .”240  In a memo-
 238 Seed, supra note 139, at 24.  See also Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy, supra note 
122, at 69 (“As head of the English Reformed Church, Elizabeth simply assumed the 
powers once held exclusively by Rome to extend the boundaries of the Christian 
faith to heathen and infidel held-lands.  She issued her own colonizing charters of 
conquest to England’s Protestant brand of New World conquistadors.”). 
 239 MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND CASES 
375 (1973). 
 240 CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA PASSED 
BETWEEN THE YEARS 1682 AND 1700, at 81–82, 88 (Staughton George et al. eds., 1879) 
[hereinafter CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA] 
(emphasis added).  See also DONALD H. KENT, HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA PURCHASES 
FROM THE INDIANS 9 (1974) (observing that “there was nothing in the Pennsylvania 
Charter which compelled Penn or his successors to purchase land from the Indians.  
The granting of a royal charter for Pennsylvania was a clear, though tacit, denial of 
Indian sovereignty, and the only rights permitted to the Indians were as occupants 
and users of the soil.”); JANE T. MERRITT, AT THE CROSSROADS: INDIANS AND EMPIRES 
ON A MID-ATLANTIC FRONTIER, 1700–1763, at 24 (2003) (“In March 1681 . . . Quaker 
William Penn took legal possession as ‘true and absolute’ proprietor of a large region 
in the mid-Atlantic when he received a charter for the province of Pennsylvania from 
Charles II of England.”); Zimmerman, supra note 235, at 69 (“When Charles II 
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randum of “Additionall Instructions” written in London on October 
28, 1681, Penn announced his intention to “buy Land of the true 
Owners wch. I think is the Susquehanna People.”241  However, just ten 
days earlier, in his famous letter to the Pennsylvanian Indians, Penn 
stated that “the king of the Countrey where I live, hath given unto me  
a great Province therein, but I desire to enjoy it with your Love  
and Consent, that we may always live together as Neighbours and fre-
inds . . . .”242  Thus, even the Quaker proprietor William Penn, who 
advised his deputy William Markham that the Indians “‘are true 
Lords of the Soil,’” assumed that his authority to be in the New World 
came from England, and consequently had no qualms about selling 
tracts in Pennsylvania before purchasing any land from the Indians.243
Appearing contemporaneously with the royal charters were vari-
ous legal and moral theories propounded by Englishmen to justify 
the dispossession of the native occupants of America.  At first, the fo-
cus was on the Indians themselves: they did not possess a right or title 
to the lands of America because of their barbarism and heathenism.  
Robert Gray, a promoter of the Virginia Company of London, con-
tended in his Good Speed to Virginia (1609) that the Indians have “only 
a generall residencie there, as wild beasts have in the forest,” and an-
other pamphlet, published a year later, argued that “it is not 
unlawfull, that wee possesse part of their land, and dwell with them, 
and defend ourselves from them . . . because there is no other, mod-
erate, and mixt course, to bring them to conversion, but by dailie 
conversation.”244  Reverend William Symonds defended the “sea to 
granted Penn his charter, the rights of the Indians did not concern either party.  By 
accepting the charter and the title of ‘true and absolute’ proprietary, Penn clearly, 
though tacitly, denied the Indians’ sovereignty.  He accepted the notion that the 
monarchy had the right to dispense of North American land without consulting the 
native inhabitants.”). 
 241 WILLIAM PENN’S OWN ACCOUNT OF THE LENNI LENAPE OR DELAWARE INDIANS 58 
(Albert Cook Myers ed., 1970). 
 242 Id. at 60.  See also id. at 64 (“William Penn’s Letter to a Leading Pennsylvania 
Indian Chief,” dated June 21, 1682, stating that “[t]he King of England who is a 
Great Prince hath for divers Reasons Granted to me a large Country in America 
which however I am willing to Injoy upon friendly termes with thee.”). 
 243 STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 9 (1983); Zimmerman, su-
pra note 235, at 68, 74.  See also MERRITT, supra note 240, at 25 (“Penn insisted on 
purchasing land from Indians to clear title for subsequent sale to white settlers.  In 
reality, however, he often sold large tracts to potential settlers or land speculators be-
fore Indians agreed on treaty provisions.”);  Zimmerman, supra note 235, at 72 
(“Unlike any other colonial proprietor, [Penn] recognized the Indians’ title to the 
land on which they lived.  However, recognizing the Indians’ title and acting on that 
recognition were two quite distinct elements of an Indian policy.”). 
 244 OBERG, supra note 62, at 52 (quoting the Virginia Company’s A true declaration 
of the estate of the colonie in Virginia with a confutation of such scandalous reports as have 
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sea” grant in the 1609 Virginia charter by noting that Psalm 72 con-
tains a prayer that “Thy dominion should be from sea to sea, and from the 
River to the end of the land.”245  Perhaps most significantly, Sir Edward 
Coke—the eminent jurist who helped write the 1606 charter and be-
came a director of the London Company—laid down the rule in 
Calvin’s Case (1608) that “all infidels are in law perpetual enemies” 
and that, accordingly, “when an infidel country is conquered, there 
being no established law among infidels which a Christian people can 
recognize, the rules laid down by the king apply.”246  Although Cal-
vin’s Case did not directly concern Indian land rights, Coke 
maintained that in the event of a conquest of an infidel country, all of 
their laws ceased immediately, including property laws, and “if such a 
conquest were assumed—as was done in Virginia—it followed that 
the conqueror might regard such territory as absolutely vacant in 
law.”247  In 1640, the town of Milford, Connecticut, passed three re-
tended to the disgrace of so worthy an enterprise 10 (1610)).  See also Christian, supra note 
163, at xiii (noting that “the prevailing ideology of the age of European discovery 
and colonization gave no credence to the humanity of the Amerindians.  As subhu-
mans they were incapable of possessing rights—legal, natural, or divine.”). 
Samuel Purchas, successor to Richard Hakluyt as promoter of English overseas 
colonization, argued in 1625 that “colonization was in keeping with God’s purpose 
that the Indian should hear the gospel before the Last Judgment, which was ex-
pected momentarily.”  Loren E. Pennington, Hakluytus Posthumus: Samuel Purchas and 
the Promotion of English Overseas Expansion, in 14 EMPORIA STATE RES. STUDIES 5, 36 
(William H. Seiler ed., Graduate Div. of the Kan. State Teachers Coll. 1966).  See also 
Squadrito, supra note 77, at 158.  Three years earlier, in 1622, the Virginia Company 
of London addressed the legality of a “Graunt of certaine Land passed vnto him [Mr. 
Barkham] by Sr Geo: Yeardley vnder the Seale of the Colony vpon condicion that he 
compounded for the same with Opachankano and procured a confirmacion thereof 
from the Companie here within two yeares after the said Graunt . . . .”  2 RECORDS OF 
THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON 94 (Susan Myra Kingsbury ed., 1906).  The Com-
pany held that 
by the King’s Letters Patents no other but the Company here . . . had 
power to dispose of land in Virginia . . . [and] this Grant of Barkham’s 
was held to be very dishonorable and prejudicial to the Company in 
regard it was limited with a Proviso to compound with Opachankano, 
whereby a Sovereignty in that heathen Infidel was acknowledged, and 
the Company’s Title thereby much infringed. 
Id. at 94–95 (language modernized). 
 245 Juricek, supra note 51, at 17 (quoting William Symonds, Virginia: A Sermon 
Preached at White-Chappel (April 25, 1609)). 
 246 GOEBEL, supra note 139, at 105. 
 247 Juricek, supra note 51, at 18 n.45.  William Blackstone, whose four volumes of 
Commentaries appeared between 1765 and 1769, cited Calvin’s Case for the following 
proposition: 
But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their 
own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he  
does actually change them, the antient laws of the country remain, 
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solves which succinctly communicate these principles: “Voted, that 
the earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof; voted, that the earth is 
given to the Saints; voted, we are the Saints.”248
Other Englishmen focused instead on the Indians’ land usage to 
justify dispossession.  As previously noted, John Winthrop and his fel-
low Puritans criticized the failure of natives to “improve the Land,” 
and developed the notion of vacuum domicilium to justify coloniza-
tion.249  Such ideas were articulated in greater detail by philosopher 
and political theorist John Locke (1632–1704), particularly in his Two 
Treatises of Government (1690).250  In the fifth chapter of the Second 
Treatise, Locke developed the idea of a natural right to property and, 
in so doing, defended England’s claims over Indian land in America.  
As summarized by Barbara Arneil, 
 Until the end of the seventeenth century, when the English ac-
tually settled in the new world, property had been defined by 
occupation.  However, this definition became a problem in Amer-
ica when the Amerindians and their English defenders claimed, 
by virtue of their occupation, proprietorship in certain tracts of 
land coveted by the English.  A new definition of property, which 
would allow the English to supersede the rights claimed by virtue 
of occupation, was needed.  The Two Treatises of Government pro-
vided the answer.  Labour, rather than occupation, would begin 
property, and those who tilled, enclosed, and cultivated the soil 
would be its owners.251
unless such as are against the law of God, as in the case of an infidel 
country . . . . 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *108.  Blackstone’s Commentaries were 
widely read and regarded by Americans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1996) (“Partly because the Commentaries were more accessible to Americans than 
were other published sources of law, ‘[a]ll of our formative documents—the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the seminal 
decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall—were drafted by attorneys 
steeped in [Blackstone’s Commentaries].’”) (quoting ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND 
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984)). 
 248 ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES 192 (2001). 
 249 VAUGHN, supra note 60, at 110. 
 250 See id. at 112 (noting that “vacuum domicilium . . . was . . . partly a pre-Lockean 
expression of the English theory of property rights in a state of nature.”).  John 
Locke, “as secretary to both the Lord Proprietors of Carolina (1668–1675) and the 
Council of Trade and Plantations (1673–1675), was immersed in the colonial debates 
of his day . . . .”  Barbara Arneil, The Wild Indian’s Venison: Locke’s Theory of Property and 
English Colonialism in America, 44 POL. STUDIES 60, 60 (1996). 
 251 ARNEIL, supra note 88, at 18.  See also CRONON, supra note 58, at 79 (noting John 
Locke’s description of American Indians as a people “whom Nature having furnished 
as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty, . . . yet for want of  
improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we  
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When Locke asserted that, “in the beginning all the World was 
America,”252 he had in mind “Land that is left wholly to Nature, that 
hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting . . . .”253  Eng-
lish claims to such “vacant” or “waste” lands, Locke theorized, were 
ultimately based not on papal or royal authority, but on natural 
right.254  This notion had a particular appeal for persons settling in 
America.  When Reverend John Bulkley of Colchester, Connecticut, 
delivered his Christmas Eve sermon in 1724, he paid homage to “Mr. 
Lock” and preached that “the English . . . had . . . an Undoubted Right to 
Enter upon and Impropriate all such parts of [America] as lay Wast or Unim-
proved by the Natives and this without any consideration or allowance made 
to them for it.”255  The defendants in Johnson v. McIntosh also relied on 
John Locke to argue that the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians had 
“acquired no proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory which 
they wandered over . . . .”256  John Marshall essentially agreed, declar-
ing that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce 
enjoy. . . .”); Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A 
Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1120 (1996) 
(“As every student of political theory knows, traditional Lockean property theory is 
grounded on the basic axiom set forth in paragraph 27 of the Second Treatise: ‘What-
soever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes 
it his property.’”); Williams, Jr., Origins of the Status of the American Indian, supra note 
131, at 3 n.4 (“John Locke reasoned that the Indians’ occupancy of their aboriginal 
lands did not involve an adequate amount of ‘labor’ to perfect a ‘property’ interest 
in the soil.”). 
 252 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 301(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press, student ed. 1988) (1690). 
 253 Id. at 297.  Locke argued that the “several Nations of the Americans . . . are rich 
in Land . . . yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of 
the Conveniencies we enjoy.”  Id. at 296–97.  But see CRONON, supra note 58, at 79 
(“What Locke failed to notice was that the Indians did not recognize themselves as 
poor.”). 
 254 ARNEIL, supra note 88, at 19.  Locke’s characterization of America as “vacant” 
and “waste” land is essentially Puritan: “Colonists were both morally and legally justi-
fied in taking native waste land and subduing it, because God intended that land be 
cultivated.”  Squadrito, supra note 77, at 156.  See also ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE 
WHITE MAN’S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE 
PRESENT 120 (1978) (“Terra nullius was an ambiguous term, however, for it could 
mean lands totally vacant of people or merely not inhabited by peoples possessing 
those religions and customs that Europeans recognized as equal to their own under 
the international law arising in this era.”); BOTEIN, supra note 243, at 10 (“‘If the title 
of occupiers be good in land unpeopled,’ Raleigh had asked decades before perma-
nent settlement began in North America, ‘why should it be bad accounted in a 
country peopled over thinly?’”). 
 255 Rev. John Bulkley, Preface to ROGER WOLCOTT, POETICAL MEDITATIONS 53–54 
(1725). 
 256 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569–70 (1823). 
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savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in possession of their country, 
was to leave the country a wilderness . . . .”257
If the English could justly and legally claim title to lands in 
America by virtue of discovery, royal patent, and natural right, why 
was so much property purchased from the Indians, both in public 
and private transactions?  In part it was a reaction to the Dutch policy 
of purchasing lands from Indians.  In 1632, a dispute arose when a 
Dutch ship carrying furs from New Netherland was seized while har-
boring in Plymouth, England.258  The Dutch argued that they had 
“‘acquired the property, partly by confederation with the owners of 
the lands, and partly by purchase,’” and argued that no nation could 
“‘prevent the subjects of another to trade in countries whereof his 
people have not taken, nor obtained actual possession from the right 
owners, either by contract or purchase.’”259  The English denied “that 
the Indians were possessors bona fidei of those countries, so as to be 
able to dispose of them either by sale or donation, their residences 
being unsettled and uncertain . . . .”260  Nevertheless, partly in re-
sponse to Dutch expansion, the English colonies of New England 
began purchasing tracts from the Indians.261
A few examples should suffice.  On July 15, 1636, William Pyn-
chon purchased from the Agawam village a tract of land near present-
 257 Id. at 590. 
 258 Jennings, supra note 68, at 111. 
 259 Id.; JENNINGS, supra note 202, at 133; Letter from West Indian Company to 
States General (May 5, 1632), in 1 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 202, at 45, 50, 52.  See also Norgren, supra note 43, 
at 78 (“Felix Cohen has argued that the Dutch practice of entering treaties for Native 
American land expressed three critical premises, articulated in the early seventeenth 
century document prepared for the Dutch West Indies Company, which declared: 
(1) that both parties to the treaty were sovereign powers; (2) that the Indian tribe 
had a transferable title to the land under discussion; and (3) that the acquisition of 
Indian lands could not be left to individual colonists but must be controlled by the 
larger institution of government, or the Crown itself.”). 
 260 Answer to the Remonstrance presented to the King and the Lords, his Com-
missioners, by their Lordships the Ambassador and Deputy of the Lords States 
General of the United Provinces, in 1 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL 
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 202, at 58. 
 261 Berman, supra note 40, at 653.  See also BOORSTIN, supra note 202, at 260 (“Not 
until the English had their first land disputes with the Dutch did they too begin ‘buy-
ing’ tracts from the Indians.  The English, however, still treated such ‘purchase’ not 
as an essential of good legal title but simply as a matter of good conscience or ap-
pearance. . . . In the eyes of English law, an Indian ‘deed’ thus remained only an 
indication of Indian willingness to vacate lands to which the Indians had never had 
any legal title in the first place.”). 
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day Springfield, Massachusetts.262  From Maine, over seventy Indian 
deeds survive from the seventeenth century, dating as far back as 
1639.263  On March 5, 1640, the Norwalk Indians sold part of their ter-
ritory to Roger Ludlow, a resident of Fairfield, Connecticut.264  In 
1644, native occupants also sold the site of Harvard College.265  Na-
nuddemance deeded land to John Parker on June 14, 1659, and 
“Jane the Indean of Scarbrough” sold land to Andrew and Arthur Al-
ger on September 19, 1659.266  In the summer of 1678, four Indians 
deeded an island in the Delaware River to Elizabeth Kinsey.267  In 
1683 “Shauk-a-num and Et-hoe sold one hundred acres of land ‘lying 
neer Cohanzey on Delaware-river’ to John Nicholls for a handful of 
trade goods.”268  In 1725, Edmund Cartlidge purchased a “‘plantation 
Lyeing In a Turn of Conestogoe Creek Called by the name of the In-
dian Pointt’ from Wiggoneeheenah, a Delaware. . . .”269  A year later, 
Betty Caco, queen of the Ababcos, and Permetasusk, queen of the 
Hatchswamps, deeded land in Maryland to Edward Norton for six 
pounds current money.270  By 1676, Governor Josiah Winslow of Ply-
mouth Colony remarked that “‘I think I can clearly say that . . . the 
English did not possess one foot of land in this colony but what was 
fairly obtained by honest purchase of the Indian proprietors.’”271
While many who purchased land from Indians did not consider 
the “Indian title” to be a legally recognizable title, there were excep-
tions.  Quaker minister Thomas Chalkley in 1738 acknowledged the 
primacy of Indian land rights, asserting that “‘Nature hath given 
them, and their Fore-fathers, the Possession of this Continent’” and 
 262 CRONON, supra note 58, at 66.  Cronon contends that, when Indians traded or 
sold lands, “what were exchanged were usufruct rights, acknowledgments by one 
group that another might use an area for planting or hunting or gathering.”  Id. at 
62.  See also BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 223, at 20 n.* (observing that “the idea of pri-
vate tenure did not exist, although a concept nearer to the civil law doctrine of 
usufruct did.  [I.e., the right to temporary possession or use of a property belonging 
to another without causing damage to it.]”). 
 263 Emerson W. Baker, A Scratch with a Bear’s Paw: Anglo-Indian Deeds in Early Maine, 
36 ETHNOHISTORY 235, 236 (1989). 
 264 JOHN W. DE FOREST, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT FROM THE 
EARLIEST KNOWN PERIOD TO 1850, at 177 (Scholarly Press 1970) (1852). 
 265 MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 200. 
 266 THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: INDIAN VOICES FROM EARLY AMERICA 84–85 
(Colin G. Calloway ed., 1994). 
 267 Edwin B. Bronner, Indian Deed for Petty’s Island, 89 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 
111, 111 (1965). 
 268 MERRITT, supra note 240, at 36. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Robinson, supra note 220, at 92. 
 271 MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 200. 
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arguing that “‘no People . . . ought to take away, or settle, on other 
Mens Lands or Rights, without Consent, or purchasing the same.’”272  
A contemporary of Roger Williams, Thomas Copley of Maryland, ac-
quired land directly from the Patuxent Indians, including land given 
in 1639 as a gift from an Indian chief.273  Moreover, Copley and other 
Jesuit leaders challenged the absolute title of Lord Baltimore to the 
Province of Maryland.274  Predictably, Thomas Copley’s arguments 
against the legitimacy of royal grants evoked a response from Lord 
Baltimore comparable to the reaction to Roger Williams by John 
Winthrop and the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony: 
 After forcing the Jesuits to release title to the area obtained di-
rectly from the Indians, the proprietor took the additional step of 
prohibiting the purchase of lands from the natives.  A restriction 
enacted by the governor with the assent of freemen in 1649 noted 
that various persons had either “purchased or accepted” land 
from Indians but without title derived from the proprietor under 
the great seal of the province, an action described as contemptu-
ous of the proprietor’s “dignity & rights” and productive of 
“dangerous consequence if not timely prevented.”  Consequently, 
all such purchases or acquisitions that had been made in the past 
or that would be made in the future were null and void.275
Eventually every colony regulated, at some point in time, the pur-
chase of Indian lands.  Although by no means uniform, such 
restrictions typically required government approval of purchases by 
individuals and declared transactions without government sanction to 
be null and void.  For example, in the Colony of Connecticut, pur-
chases of Indian lands were regulated by court order or legislation in 
1663,276 1680,277 1687,278 1705,279 1706,280 1707,281 1710,282 1717,283 and 
 272 WARREN R. HOFSTRA, THE PLANTING OF NEW VIRGINIA: SETTLEMENT AND 
LANDSCAPE IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 122 (2004) (quoting Thomas Chalkley writing 
to the members of the Hopewell Meeting in 1738). 
 273 Robinson, supra note 220, at 89. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. at 89–90 (footnote omitted). 
 276 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT PRIOR TO THE UNION 
WITH NEW HAVEN COLONY, MAY, 1665, at 402 (J.H. Trumbull ed., Brown & Parsons 
1850) (May 14, 1663). 
 277 3 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, MAY, 1678–JUNE, 1689, 
at 56–57 (J.H. Trumbull ed., Case, Lockwood & Co. 1859) (May 17, 1680). 
 278 Id. at 422–23 (June 1, 1687). 
 279 4 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, FROM AUGUST, 1689, TO 
MAY, 1706, at 526 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Case, Lockwood and Brainard 1868) (Oc-
tober 1705). 
WATSON 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  8:36:03 AM 
536 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:481 
 
1722,284 suggesting that such purchases were commonplace—and 
government restrictions were ineffectual.  One reason for govern-
ment oversight was to minimize fraudulent and unfair dealings, 
which produced resentment and undermined Indian relations.285  
 280 5 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, FROM OCTOBER, 1706, 
TO OCTOBER, 1716, at 4 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Case, Lockwood and Brainard 1870) 
(October 10, 1706). 
 281 Id. at 30 (October 9, 1707) (repeal). 
 282 Id. at 160 (May 1710) (proposed but not enacted). 
 283 6 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, FROM MAY 1717, TO 
OCTOBER, 1725, at 13 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Case, Lockwood and Brainard 1872) 
(May 9, 1717). 
 284 Id. at 355–56 (October 11, 1722).  The 1722 “Act for preventing Trespasses on 
the Lands of this Colony, &c” is illustrative: 
     Whereas this Assembly have been informed that, notwithstanding 
the ancient laws of this Colony to the contrary, some persons have pre-
tended to purchase of Indians their rights as natives, of many 
considerable tracts of land lying within this Colony; and altho all such 
deeds when obtained without the leave and consent of this Assembly 
are by the said law declared to be ipso facto void, yet under colour of 
such deeds persons unacquainted with the said laws may be imposed 
upon, deceived and greatly wronged, as well as the settlement of such 
lands in plantation, pursuant to the end expressed in our charter, hin-
dered: For the prevention hereof, 
     Be it enacted by the Governour, Council and Representatives, in General 
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That whosoever shall pre-
sume to purchase any lands within the bounds of this Colony, of any 
Indians whatsoever, without the leave of this Assembly hereafter first 
had and obtained, under colour or pretence of such Indians being the 
proprietors of said lands by a native right, or shall, having purchased of 
any Indians lands in such manner, without leave of this Assembly first 
had, or the confirmation of this Assembly afterwards obtained, pre-
sume to make any sale of, or any settlements upon, any lands so 
purchased, every person who shall in any such manner transgress and 
be thereof convicted in the county court or in the superior court of 
that county where such lands shall lye, shall incur the penalty of fifty 
pounds to the treasury of this Colony.  And whatsoever person or per-
sons shall suffer any wrong, by means of such sale or settlement as 
aforesaid, shall recover in either of the said courts, upon proof of such 
wrong by him suffered, treble damages against the person or persons 
so wronging of him. 
Id. 
 285 For example: 
[A] South Carolina act of 1739, forbidding purchases of land from In-
dians without the approval of the provincial authorities, bluntly stated 
the reason for the act to be that: “such purchases being generally ob-
tained from Indians by unfair representations, fraud, and 
circumvention, or by making them gifts or presents of little value, by 
which practices great resentments and animosities have been created 
amongst the Indians toward the inhabitants of this province.” 
KINNEY, supra note 98, at 15.  See also WALTER HART BLUMENTHAL, AMERICAN INDIANS 
DISPOSSESSED: FRAUD IN LAND CESSIONS FORCED UPON THE TRIBES 14–17 (Arno Press 
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However, John De Forest, in his History of the Indians of Connecticut, 
observes that “it was not for the benefit of the Indians only that . . . 
[these regulations were] promulgated; but also, if not entirely for the 
purpose of asserting and preserving the jurisdiction power of the 
General Court over the unbought and unoccupied lands of the col-
ony.”286  More recently, Eric Kades argued that “[t]he universal and 
repeated enactment of laws barring purchases of land by private citi-
zens from the Indians . . . makes perfect sense as a tool of efficient 
expropriation of Indian lands.”287
Because Virginia, by virtue of its “sea to sea” royal grant, asserted 
jurisdiction over the lands purchased from the Illinois and Pianke-
shaw Indians in 1773 and 1775, it is instructive to examine Virginia 
law concerning Indian purchases.288  On November 25, 1652, Virginia 
passed the following law: 
1975) (1955) (describing the “Walking Purchase by which the Lenape . . . (Dela-
wares) were deceived in 1737.”).  Blumenthal notes that some tribes assigned 
“jocular nicknames for the whites who ousted them”: 
The frontier invaders were called by the Cherokees—
Econnaunuxulgee  (People-greedily-grasping-after-land); the Governor 
of Georgia was dubbed Econnau-popohau (Always asking for land); the 
Governor of the Territorial Tennessee, William Blount, became Tucke-
micco (Dirt King). 
Id. at 42.  See also DANIEL R. MANDELL, INDIANS IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EASTERN 
MASSACHUSETTS 134 (1996) (“The Mashpees complained in 1755 that their English 
neighbors ‘Doth bate [us] with Strong Licker’ to get them to sell their land: ‘It is a 
old saying that when the Drunk Is In the Wit is out.’”). 
 286 DE FOREST, supra note 264, at 176–77. 
 287 Kades, supra note 42, at 1079–80.  See also Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sover-
eignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY FORUM 12 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992) (“The more effective 
the prohibition on individual land sales, the greater the value of the land to the gov-
ernment because the government would have exclusive rights to buy from the 
Indians, as well as exclusive rights to sell to the colonists.”). 
 288 For a comparison of other states’ policies, see, for example, CHARTER TO 
WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 240, at 31, 143; 
COHEN, supra note 179, at 508; CRONON, supra note 58, at 70 (Massachusetts and 
Connecticut); DANE, supra note 237, at 67 (Massachusetts); 7 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE 
TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 477–79 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 
1856); 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 226, at 268 (Maryland); 
KENT, supra note 92, at 498–501; KINNEY, supra note 98, at 6–7, 11, 14–15 (Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia); MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 202 (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
and Maryland); O’BRIEN, supra note 98, at 71–72, 80; FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE 
ACTS, 1790–1834, at 6 (1962) (Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and South 
Carolina); ); PRUCHA, supra note 179, at 16, 22 (South Carolina and New York); JACK 
STAGG, ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA TO 1763, AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 7 OCTOBER 1763, at 22–24 (1981) (Maryland, New York, and 
North Carolina); VAUGHAN, supra note 60, at 114 (Massachusetts); Robert N. Clinton 
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 Whereas many Complaints have beene brought to this Assem-
blye touchinge wrong done to the Indians in takeinge away theire 
lands . . . for that it may be feared, that thereby they may bee Just-
lye Driven to dispaire, and to Attempt some Desperate Course for 
themselves . . . be it heereby ordained, and Enacted that all the 
Indians of this collonye Shall, and may hold and keepe those 
seates of Land that they now have, And that noe person, or per-
sons whatsoever be suffered to Intrench, or plant uppon Such 
places as the Indians Claime, or desire, untill full Leave from the 
governor, and Councell, or Commissioners of that place . . . . And 
noe Indians to Sell theire lands but at quarter Courts . . . and noe 
pattents Shall be adjudged sufficient, or vallid, which hath latelye 
passed, or Shall passe, Contrarye to the Sence of this Act, nor 
none to be of force which Shall Intrench uppon the Indians 
Lands to theire discontents, without Expresse order for the 
Same.289
In 1654, Eastern Shore Indians were authorized by law to sell land to 
individuals; however, a 1656 law provided, with respect to other In-
dian lands, that “for the future no such alienations or bargaines and 
sales be valid without the assent of the Assembly, This act not to 
prejudice any Christian who hath land allready granted by pattent.”290  
A similar law was passed by the General Assembly in March 1658.291  
& Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of 
Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17, 20–22 (1979) 
(Massachusetts and New York); Roback, supra note 287, at 12 (South Carolina); 
Springer, supra note 234, at 35–36, 45 (1986) (Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut). 
 289 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 226, at 43–44.  Cf. VAUGHAN, 
supra note 60, at 114 (describing a similar policy in Massachusetts). 
 290 2 COLONY LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1642–1660, at 396 (1978) [hereinafter 2 COLONY 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA].  See also 1 Stat. 393, 393–96 (Henig ed., 1823) (Congressional acts 
and resolutions, June 7–9, 1794), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 226, at 47–48; KINNEY, supra note 98, at 12; HELEN C. ROUNTREE, 
POCAHONTAS’S PEOPLE: THE POWHATAN INDIANS OF VIRGINIA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 
92 (1990) (discussing 1654 law); STAGG, supra note 288, at 21; J. LEITCH WRIGHT, JR., 
THE ONLY LAND THEY KNEW: AMERICAN INDIANS IN THE OLD SOUTH 100 (Bison Books 
1991) (1981) (noting that in light of the enacted restrictions, “colonists began ‘leas-
ing’ lands or holding them until gambling debts had been satisfied.”). 
“In the old style reckoning [Julian calendar], March 25 was the beginning of the 
year.  After the adoption of the new style, or Gregorian calendar, January 1 was taken 
as the beginning of the year and double dates are often used to indicate the time be-
tween Jan. 1 and Mar. 25.”  D.W. WELLS & R.F. WELLS, A HISTORY OF HATFIELD 
MASSACHUSETTS 22–23 (1910).  An event that took place on March 10, 1656, accord-
ing to the Old Style Julian calendar, would be dated March 10, 1657 by the 
Gregorian calendar and designated by historians as having happened on March 10, 
1656/57. 
 291 2 COLONY LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 290, at 468.  “The 1661 General Assem-
bly approved several sales of Indian lands to colonists. . . .”  FREDERIC W. GLEACH, 
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Four years later, in 1662, the General Assembly undertook a codifica-
tion of the colony’s laws: 
This Act recited that the laws prohibiting the purchase of Indian 
lands unless acknowledged at General Courts or Assemblies had 
proved fruitless and ineffectual, leading to great inconvenience.  
It enacted, inter alia, that for the future no Indian King or other 
should upon any pretence sell nor no English for any cause what-
soever purchase or buy any land then claimed or possessed by any 
Indian or Indians whatsoever and further declared that all such 
bargains and sales thereafter made were invalid, void and null.292
Virginia thereafter vacillated with respect to its regulation of In-
dian land purchases.  Jack Stagg states that, “after a costly colonial-
Indian war in 1675, the Assembly was much less committed to pre-
serving Indian lands in Virginia and rescinded the 1655 statute, 
opening up all formerly protected lands to public and private pur-
chase.”293  Lindsay Robertson contends that Virginia regulation of 
Indian land purchases, between 1705 and 1778, was controlled by a 
1705 act which “declared it unlawful ‘for an Indian king, or any other 
of the said tributary Indians whatever,’ to sell or lease to non-Indians 
any lands ‘now actually possessed, or justly claimed and pretended to 
by the said Indians,’” and further provided that “‘every bargain, sale, 
or demise hereafter made, contrary to this act,’ was . . . ‘null and 
void.’”294
If the 1705 Act applied only to “tributary” Indians, it had no ef-
fect on the sales by the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians, who, as 
Robertson points out, “were not then and never thereafter tributary 
to the colony of Virginia.”295  In June 1776, the revolutionary Virginia 
Convention resolved “that no purchases of lands within the chartered 
limits of Virginia shall be made, under any pretence whatever, from 
any Indian tribe or nation, without the approbation of the Virginia leg-
islature,” and five days later the newly adopted state constitution 
POWHATAN’S WORLD AND COLONIAL VIRGINIA: A CONFLICT OF CULTURES 193 (1997) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 292 Priestley, supra note 227, at 158.  See also GLEACH, supra note 291, at 193; 
OBERG, supra note 62, at 188. 
 293 STAGG, supra note 288, at 22. 
 294 Robertson, Brief for the Appellants, supra note 67, at 866.  See also MANN BUTLER, 
A HISTORY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, FROM ITS EXPLORATION AND 
SETTLEMENT BY THE WHITES, TO THE CLOSE OF THE NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN, IN 1813, 
at lxvii (J.A. James & Co. ed., 1836) (“Again, in 1705, the same policy is confirmed.”).  
In 1748, Virginia passed laws allowing two tributary tribes to sell land.  15 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 226, at 190–92 (setting forth laws, dated 
December 17, 1747, allowing the Pamunkeys and Nottoways to sell land). 
 295 Robertson, Brief for the Appellants, supra note 67, at 866. 
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provided, in its twenty-first article, that “no purchase of lands should 
be made of the Indian natives but in behalf of the public by authority 
of the General Assembly.”296  However, unless retroactive, these laws 
did not impact the Illinois-Wabash purchases of 1773 and 1775.  
Thus, with respect to the question of whether the land sales at issue 
in Johnson v. McIntosh were prohibited by Virginia law (assuming Vir-
ginia had jurisdiction), there was considerable doubt.297
V. “THE SINNE OF THE PATTENTS” REDUX: INDIAN TITLE IN NEW JERSEY 
Protest against “the sinne of the Pattents” did not die with Roger 
Williams.298  The question resurfaced in the 1660s in the Province of 
New Jersey, where individual landowners questioned the legitimacy of 
title by royal grant and defended the validity of title by Indian pur-
chase.  This lesser known dispute, which lasted for over a century, was 
reminiscent of the Williams controversy: the assertion by individual 
purchasers that the Indians could convey a complete and lawful title 
was strenuously opposed by government officials, who viewed it as 
nothing less than a seditious challenge to Crown authority.  The con-
 296 The Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates, Held at the Capitol, in the City of Wil-
liamsburg, in the Colony of Virginia, on Monday the 6th of May, 1776, at 154 (Purdie, 
1776) (emphasis added); see generally BUTLER, supra note 294, at lxvii (describing simi-
lar policies enacted throughout the colonial period); PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–
1787, at 83 (1983) (describing Convention resolution). 
 297 Marshall also exclaimed in Johnson v. McIntosh that the 1763 Royal Proclama-
tion constituted “an additional objection to the title of the plaintiffs.”  21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543, 594 (1823) (emphasis added).  On October 7, 1763, King George III of Great 
Britain issued a proclamation which provided in pertinent part: 
     And whereas great frauds and abuses have been committed in the 
purchasing lands of the [American] Indians, to the great prejudice of 
our interests, and to the great dissatisfaction of the said Indians; . . . we 
do . . . strictly enjoin and require, that no private person do presume to 
make any purchase from the said Indians of any lands reserved to the 
said Indians within those parts of our colonies where we have thought 
proper to allow settlement; but that if at any time any of the said Indi-
ans should be inclined to dispose of the said lands, the same shall be 
purchased only for us, in our name . . . . 
Proclamation of 1763 (Oct. 7, 1763), reprinted in 3 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN & THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2135, 2138 (1973).  
See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centu-
ries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329 
(1989). 
 298 In the fall of 1749, a Virginia trader named John Ellis told Catawba Indians in 
Carolina that colonists settling the area “had no right to the Lands by them possessed 
and that even his Majesty had no right to those Lands.”  JAMES H. MERRELL, THE 
INDIANS’ NEW WORLD: CATAWBAS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS FROM EUROPEAN CONTACT 
THROUGH THE ERA OF REMOVAL 167 (1989).  Reminiscent of Roger Williams, the gov-
ernor ordered that any person making such statements be arrested.  Id. 
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flict is particularly noteworthy insofar as it presages Johnson v. 
McIntosh.  In both instances, land ownership was contested on the ba-
sis of competing chains of title.  As in Johnson, native land rights were 
championed not by the Indians themselves, but by recipients of In-
dian deeds.  And in both instances, natural rights to property were 
opposed by the doctrine of discovery, feudal law, statutory prohibi-
tions, and royal authority. 
On September 24, 1664, the Governor of the New Netherland 
Colony, Peter Stuyvesant, surrendered New Amsterdam (New York 
City) to an English naval squadron commanded by Colonel Richard 
Nicolls.  Nicolls was eager to encourage settlement, but insisted that 
land transfers must be preceded by Indian purchase.299  Puritans seek-
ing new lands quickly purchased lands from the Lenni Lenape 
Indians,300 and they received land grants from Nicolls between the 
Hudson and Delaware Rivers near present-day Elizabeth and Mon-
mouth, New Jersey.301  Unbeknownst to Nicolls, the lands in question 
had been granted by Charles II to his brother James, Duke of York 
(and later King James II), who in turn had granted the proprietary 
rights to Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley.302
 299 JOHN E. POMFRET, COLONIAL NEW JERSEY: A HISTORY 12 (1973).  See also THOMAS 
FLEMING, NEW JERSEY: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 6–8 (1977); OBERG, supra note 62, at 
149–50 (“Nicolls quickly put into effect a body of laws for the governance of New 
York.  A significant portion of this code, known as the ‘Duke’s Laws’ of 1664, dealt 
with the subject of Anglo-Indian relations.  The Duke’s Laws . . . prohibited the pur-
chase of land from Indians without the permission of the governor.”); JOHN E. 
POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS AND THEIR LANDS 8 (1964) [hereinafter 
POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS] (“Governor Nicolls in 1664, in behalf of the 
Duke, had issued a set of conditions upon which particular plantations would be cre-
ated.  First, the purchasers must obtain a clear title from the Indians; secondly, the 
inhabitants must agree to dwell together in a town; and thirdly, they must take an 
oath of allegiance to the king.”). 
 300 See POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at 9 (“On Decem-
ber 1, 1664, Nicolls issued [the Elizabethtown] patent [to four men]. . . .  For £154 in 
cloth, guns, powder, lead, kettles, and coats they purchased from the Indians a large 
tract of land lying between the Raritan and the Passaic rivers.”). 
 301 MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 13. 
 302 Id. at 12–13.  See also JOHN T. CUNNINGHAM, NEWARK 63 (1966) (“The story of 
New Jersey’s Proprietors began in 1664 when the province was given to Lord Berke-
ley and Sir George Carteret.  The former sold his share in 1673 and Carteret’s 
holdings were sold after he died in 1680.  Boards of the West and East New Jersey 
proprietors eventually included many men whose chief interest was real estate.”); 
FLEMING, supra note 299, at 13–14 (“In West Jersey the Quakers flourished so well 
that when Sir George Carteret died in 1680, twelve of the wealthiest Friends bought 
East Jersey from his widow. . . . [T]he Quakers . . .[sold some of the lands] to twelve 
other speculators, mostly Scotsmen.  The new owners organized themselves into the 
East Jersey Board of Proprietors and began trying to attract immigrants and sell them 
land.”). 
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In May 1666, Puritans from Connecticut settled along the Passaic 
River, naming their town Newark.303  Governor Carteret instructed 
the Puritans to purchase their land from the Indians, and on July 11, 
1667, the Newarkers purchased, by treaty, a 20,000-acre tract in ex-
change for goods in kind, including “four barrells of beere.”304  
However, when the proprietors, and their successors, attempted to 
collect quit-rents from the Newark purchasers and the Puritans who 
received grants from Nicolls, the settlers resisted, relying in part on 
the fact that they had first purchased the land from the Indians.305  In 
 303 DONALD L. KEMMERER, PATH TO FREEDOM: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 
IN COLONIAL NEW JERSEY, 1703–1776, at 7 (1968).  See also MCCONVILLE, supra note 
211, at 15 (“The eighty yeomen and their families had fled their homes in the ultra-
Congregationalist New Haven Colony after Charles II decreed that province would 
lose its autonomy and be joined to the Presbyterian Connecticut Colony; the mi-
grants believed that mixing with ungodly Presbyterians could lead to damnation.”). 
 304 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 302, at 24 (“[In all, the purchasers gave] ‘fifty double-
hands of powder, one hundred barrs of lead, twenty Axes, twenty Coates, ten Guns, 
twenty pistolls, ten kettles, ten Swords, four blankets, four barrells of beere, ten paire 
of breeches, fifty knives, twenty howes, eight hundred and fifty fathem of wampum, 
two Ankors of Licquers or something Equivolent and three troopers Coates.’”).  See 
also MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 17; POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra 
note 299, at 14–15 (“The boundaries of the [Newark] township were settled at two 
conferences, one in July 1667, with the Indians, the second in May, 1668, with the 
representatives of Elizabethtown. . . . [A] new instrument was drawn up with the In-
dians by which the boundaries of Newark were extended. . . . The Indians were paid 
in kind, principally powder, lead, weapons, implements, clothes, and beer.”). 
 305 FLEMING, supra note 299, at 14.  See also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 302, at 63 (“Ill 
feeling against the Proprietors could be traced back to 1670 when Berkeley and Car-
teret claimed rents due them under the terms of the grant giving them all New Jersey 
land.”); KEMMERER, supra note 303, at 7 (“Serious trouble began about 1670 when the 
first quitrents fell due.”); POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at 
18 (“Elizabethtown took a dim view of Carteret’s efforts to collect quitrents when 
they first came due in March, 1670.  At Newark, although the town meeting agreed 
to pay the quitrents, it insisted that Newark derived its title from Indian purchase, 
not by proprietary patent; therefore the inhabitants were not obliged to pay one 
halfpenny per annum to the proprietors.”).  The transplanted New Englanders con-
tinued to purchase lands from the Indians, while at the same time resisting the 
payment of quit-rents: 
[Among the customs] these freeholders brought from the extinguished 
New Haven Colony was the practice of purchasing land directly from 
the Native Americans without the approval of English authorities and 
the holding of their property free of quitrents or other quasi-feudal ob-
ligations.  
     . . . The settlers insisted that their legal rights to the 20,000-acre 
township were derived solely from the purchases made from the Lenni 
Lenape, and that they had the right to make additional acquisitions 
without the proprietors’ consent.  The townspeople engaged in further 
unauthorized native purchases in 1678, 1701, and 1744, adding some 
30,000 acres to Newark and extending the township’s boundaries some 
fifteen miles west into the North Jersey interior.  The county-sized 
Newark Tract became the nerve center of violent resistance to the 
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1675, six prominent English lawyers were asked to render their legal 
opinion on “Wither the Grant from ye Indians be Sufficient to any 
planter without a Grant from ye King or his Assignes.”306  The lawyers 
(among them Sir Henry Pollexfen and Sir John Holt, who afterwards 
became Attorney General and Chief Justice of England, respectively) 
denied the validity of private purchases of Indians lands: 
[B]y [the] Law of Nations if any people make Discovery of any 
Country of Barbarians the Prince of [that] people who make 
[the] Discovery hath [the] Right of [the] Soyle & Govermt of 
[that] place & no people can plant there without [the] Consent 
of [the] Prince or of Such Persons to whom his Right is Devoul-
ved & Conveyed . . . and tho it hath been & Still is [the] Usuall 
Practice of all Proprietrs to give their Indians Some Recompence 
for their Land & So Seems to Purchase it of them yet [that] is not 
done for want of Sufficient title from [the] King or Prince who 
hath [the] Right of Discovery but out of Prudence & Christian 
Charity Least otherwise the Indians might have destroyed [the] 
first planters . . . & thereby all hopes of Converting them to [the] 
Christian faith would be Lost in tiffs . . . .307
Legislation prohibiting the purchase of Indian lands without li-
cense from the governor, and declaring improper purchases null and 
void, was passed in 1683308 and—after New Jersey became a royal 
eighteenth-century proprietors’ property claims when the descendants 
of the original settlers refused to surrender the lands purchased from 
the Native Americans. 
MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 17.  It should be noted that the Elizabethtown and 
Monmouth settlers placed more focus on the fact they received a confirmatory grant 
from Governor Nicolls than on the Indian purchases themselves.  See KEMMERER, su-
pra note 303, at 187 (“[A]s a general rule, the Elizabeth-Town people emphasized 
Nicolls’ patent rather than Indian titles as the basis of their land claims.”); EDWIN P. 
TANNER, THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, 1664–1738, at 60 (1967).  This remained so 
even after the Duke of York in 1672 declared the patents from Nicolls to be null and 
void.  Id. at 30. 
 306 13 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
487 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1881). 
 307 Id.  See also The Queen v. Saint Catharine’s Milling & Lumber Co., 10 O.R. 196, 
206–09 (Ont. 1885), aff’d, 13 O.A.R. 148 (Ont. 1886), aff’d, 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can. 
1887), aff’d, 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C. 1888); KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL 
TITLE 222 (1989). 
 308 See 6 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW 
JERSEY (1738–1747), at 302 (William A. Whitehead ed., 1882) [hereinafter 6 HISTORY 
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY] (noting that “the Governor, Council and Representa-
tives of the People of East New-Jersey, in General Assembly met . . . in the Year 1683, 
to make an Act, ‘forbidding all Treaties with the Indians without Licence of the Gov-
ernor, and the taking of any Deed from them, but in the Name of the Lords 
Proprietors of East New-Jersey, upon Pain of being prosecuted as seditious Persons, 
and as Breakers of the King’s Peace, and the publick Peace and Safety of the Prov-
ince.’”); EDGAR JACOB FISHER, NEW JERSEY AS A ROYAL PROVINCE, 1783 TO 1776, at 185–
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province—in 1703.309  Nevertheless, settlers in New Jersey (and in 
Newark in particular) continued to follow in the tradition of Roger 
Williams and insist that they could hold property solely by their In-
dian purchase. 
The controversy over title to lands in New Jersey and the right to 
collect quit-rents was revived in the 1740s when the proprietors filed 
numerous ejectment suits.310  On March 30, 1742, two proprietors re-
ported to their board that  
they had good information that sundry of the members of the As-
sembly in private conversation in discourse on the titles of land in 
this Province, did express their sentiments, that the Indian titles 
were the best, which opinion if propagated, might tend to the 
ruin of the Proprietary titles of this Province . . . .311   
Private conversation was followed by action when the Elizabethtown 
settlers in 1744 petitioned the King-in-Council, seeking recognition 
of lands that “for great and valuable Considerations, [they] did pur-
chase . . . from certain Indians. . . .”312 The proprietors countered in 
April 1745, filing a suit against the Elizabethtown claimants in the 
86 (1967); JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEW 
JERSEY, 1683–1702, at 127 (Preston W. Edsall ed., 1937). 
 309 See LEE, supra note 203, at 67; MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 202; POMFRET, THE 
NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at 86.  Fisher further described the 1703 Act 
as follows: 
     In the instructions to Lord Cornbury, the first royal governor, he 
was forbidden to allow any persons except the proprietors or their 
agents to purchase lands from the Indians.  The first act of the legisla-
ture under the royal government was “for regulating the Purchasing of 
Land from the Indians.”  It was provided that after December 1, 1703, 
no person could purchase land from the Indians except he had a right 
of propriety and obtained a license. . . . Unless the person obtained a 
grant from the proprietors within six months after the publication of 
the act, improper purchases were declared void. 
FISHER, supra note 308, at 185–86 (footnote omitted).  New Jersey was governed as 
two distinct provinces, West Jersey and East Jersey, between 1674 and 1702. 
 310 See POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at 109 (“During the 
[Governor Lewis] Morris administration, especially during the years 1741 to 1743, 
there was a spate of suits over the validity of Indian titles, which were invariably de-
cided in favor of the proprietors.”).  See also JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON 
RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEW JERSEY, 1683–1702, supra note 308, at 80 (“[T]he 
question of title was always germane to an Ejectment proceeding . . . .”). 
 311 2 THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF PROPRIETORS OF THE EASTERN DIVISION OF NEW 
JERSEY FROM 1725 TO 1744, at 162 (Gen. Bd. of Proprietors of the E. Div. of N.J. 
1960).  In October 1742, the proprietors informed English officials that “sundry per-
sons have at sundry times clandestinely called the Indians together, and made 
purchases of lands from them, without having any right to the soil under the Crown 
or any license to call the Indians together or to make such purchases . . . .”  Id. at 
219. 
 312 MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 174. 
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Chancery of New Jersey, consisting of “a staggering folio of 1,500 
handwritten sheets, comprising over 160 pages of text and maps 
when printed, and evidencing the labor of three years’ research and 
writing.”313  A flash point finally occurred when Newark anti-
proprietor leader Samuel Baldwin was arrested and jailed for cutting 
timber on a proprietary tract.314  Baldwin adamantly denied that he 
was trespassing, claiming title by virtue of an Indian deed.315  A mid-
afternoon riot ensued on September 19, 1745, when 150 people 
“flooded into town armed with clubs, axes and crowbars, . . . brushed 
aside the sheriff, broke open the jail door and freed Baldwin, without 
the nicety of bail.”316
What followed was an escalating war of words.  In February 1746, 
Griffin Jenkins published “A Brief Vindication of the Purchasers Against 
the Proprietors, In A Christian Manner,” and appealed to the royal con-
science: 
I do think our Gracious King . . . will do Justice amongst his Sub-
jects, by giving every one his Right and Title; neither do I think 
that he will take away from these poor Inhabitants one Foot of 
Land, that they bought of the Natives; and I doubt not but he will 
Vindicate them in their Proceedings, for it does look reasonable 
that they are the right Owners, by Reason of their Fore-fathers 
went in Hazard of their Lives among them, if they had not bought 
these Lands, they could not have any Peace among them.317
The proprietors responded a month later by issuing a public state-
ment which denounced the “setting up sham Deeds, procured from 
stroling Indians, in Place of the Title of the Crown of England . . . .”318  
 313 MILTON M. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN WHIG: WILLIAM LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK 134 
(rev. ed. 1993).  “The Elizabethtown claimants engaged William Livingston and Wil-
liam Smith, two prominent attorneys, to prepare ‘An Answer to a Bill in the 
Chancery of New Jersey,’ which was completed in August, 1751, and published the 
next year.”  POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at 116.  
“[D]espite the immense labors that had gone into its preparation, the suit was never 
brought to trial.”  KLEIN, supra, at 135. 
 314 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 302, at 64. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id.  See also POMFRET, THE NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS, supra note 299, at109–10; 3 
THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF PROPRIETORS OF THE EASTERN DIVISION OF NEW JERSEY 
FROM 1745 TO 1764, at 90 (Gen. Bd. of Proprietors of the E. Div. of N.J. 1960). 
 317 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 308, at 284.  See also 
MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 168 (“Griffin Jenkins’s religiously charged pamphlet, 
the Brief Vindication, maintained that the original possession and improvement of the 
Newark lands by Native American owners established the later settlers’ legal title.”); 
id. at 170 (“Jenkins’s pamphlet teetered on defending the Indian purchases by way of 
universal natural law without clearly articulating that law’s character.”). 
 318 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 308, at 319. 
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The proprietors argued that the purchases violated the Acts of 1683 
and 1703 (ignoring that most transactions occurred earlier), but also 
contended that—even in the absence of statutory prohibitions—
reliance on Indian title was misplaced, inconsistent with feudal law, 
and an affront to the Crown: 
 To pretend to hold Lands by an Indian Deed only, is not that 
declaring the Indian Grantor to be the Superior Lord of that 
Land, and disowning the Crown of England to be so? . . . [I]s not 
that an Overt Act of withdrawing the Allegiance due to the Crown 
of England?  (from which all Lands within its Dominions must be 
held mediately or immediately). . . . And do not those Overt Acts 
or Endeavours in their Nature approach to High Treason? 
 . . . . 
  . . . [T]he silly Position aforesaid, [is] false in it self, as the Indians 
had no Notion of Property in Lands more than in Air, until the 
Christians came amongst them (except in the small Spots on 
which they planted their Indian Corn, and those Spots did not 
occupy so much as one Acre of a Thousand Acres; so that the re-
maining 999 Acres might properly be said to be void and 
uninhabited, and in the Power of the Crown absolutely to grant; 
and except as to Hunting.)319
Undeterred, the Newark rioters prepared two formal petitions, which 
were read to the assembly on April 17, 1746.  Samuel Nevill moved to 
reject the petitions, declaring them to be “a Notorious Libel upon the 
Crown of England,”320 and gravely warned that the issue presented—
”whether the Property in the Soil of this Colony is vested in the 
Crown of England, or in the Indian Natives?”—was a “dangerous Dis-
pute to be disputed . . . .”321
Nevertheless, the proponents of Indian title persevered, and in-
deed carried the dispute to even higher levels.  In 1746, an unsigned 
letter published in a New York newspaper turned Lockean theory to 
the advantage of Newark purchasers by contending that Locke’s guid-
ing principle, that vacant land is “made the Property of that Man, 
who bestowed his Labour on it,” legitimated native title to the lands 
 319 Id. at 321–23.  See generally FISHER, supra note 308, at 189. 
 320 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 308, at 325. 
 321 Id. at 331.  See also MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 166.  Nevill further noted 
that “[b]y allowing . . . any other than the Crown of England and its Assigns, to be 
the true Owners and Proprietors, a perpetual Uncertainty would evidently follow who 
were the true Owners and Proprietors.”  6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra 
note 308, at 344. 
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in question, because the Indians allegedly worked the property prior 
to its sale.322
A year later, in their Answer to the Council of Proprietor’s two Publica-
tions; Sett forth at Perth-Amboy the 25th of March 1746, and the 25th of March 
1747323 (hereinafter “the Answer”), the Newark settlers presented a 
comprehensive title defense, beginning with the contention that their 
purchases were fairly obtained and supported by ample considera-
tion: 
 Our Predecessors (Inhabiting Newark, &c.) . . . Purchased, not 
of some Strolling Indians, or for some few Bottles of Rum, as  
is suggested by the Proprietors in their Publication, but of  
their Chiefs, at a dear Rate, and with a great Sum, for the then 
Times . . . .  
 . . . Who could Question our just Right to the Soil; considering 
the due measures our Ancestors took to obtain it.324
Then, in the true spirit of Roger Williams, the Answer questioned the 
right and authority of Charles II to grant the lands without first pur-
chasing them from the native occupants: 
 We hope you’ll give us leave to ask how he came by them, was it 
by Discovery, by Conquest, by Gift, or by Contract, was the Discov-
ery made in his Day? . . .  
 . . .[C]an it be supposed [the Indians] had no Right unto . . . 
their Lands[?]  Yes, Doubtless they had, from the Great and Abso-
lute Proprietor of the Whole Universe . . . . 
 . . . 
 . . . The Advantage any Nation hath over another, in Might & 
Power, in True Religion, or in the Acts of Government, War or 
Improvements, or other Arts & Sciences, doth not . . . give the Na-
tion . . . a Right to the Possessions of another People . . . .325
 322 KEMMERER, supra note 303, at 200 n.58.  See also MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 
167 (“As the property conflicts intensified, the disaffected turned to the theories of 
John Locke and other seventeenth-century writers to argue that property rights came 
from possession and labor rather than from institutional authority.”). 
 323 See supra note 290 (discussing the use of “double dates,” i.e. “the 25th of March 
1746, and the 25th of March 1747,” to indicate the time between Jan. 1 and Mar. 25 
after the adoption of the Gregorian calender system). 
 324 7 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
(1746–1751), at 31–32 (William A. Whitehead ed., 1883) [hereinafter 7 HISTORY OF 
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY].  The issue of fair dealing was also raised, and rejected, in 
Johnson v. McIntosh.  See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823) (“The facts, as stated in 
the case agreed, show the authority of the chiefs who executed this conveyance, so 
far as it could be given by their own people; and likewise show, that the particular 
tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful possession of the land they sold.”). 
 325 7 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 324, at 34–36.  The Answer 
also argues that “the Granting Lisences by the Governments to Purchase Lands of 
them, admits them, to have a Right to sell them,” and that “the latter Act of 1703 . . . 
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The thesis of the Newark purchasers’ 1747 Answer is as radical as 
the view espoused by Roger Williams a century earlier, and as 
straightforward as the position taken by the Illinois and Wabash Land 
Company three-quarters of century thereafter:  
We know not what Right the Crown had to those Lands before [we] Pur-
chased of the Natives, but [as] the Owners of such Lands by and under 
such Purchase [we] do humbly insist and rely upon it, that by such Pur-
chases [we] have a full Right and Property in the Lands so purchased.326   
The Newark purchasers’ position is completely at odds with John 
Marshall’s description of Indian land rights in Johnson v. McIntosh. 
The dispute between the Newark purchasers and the proprietors 
was never resolved by judicial action (or otherwise),327 yet it serves as a 
postscript to Williams’ banishment by the General Court of the Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony, and as a prelude to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. McIntosh.  Most of the basic arguments 
for and against Indian title were now in place.  However, significant 
developments still lay ahead, such as the rise (and fall) of the specula-
tive land companies, the regulation of Indian land sales by the Crown 
itself, the American Revolution, and the ensuing struggle between 
the national government and several states for control of the newly 
cannot . . . Annul or Vacate any of the Purchases we are concerned in, or for, they 
being all made before said Act.”  Id. at 36, 40.  See also MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 
169 (“The Newark purchasers’ Answer of 1747 . . . insisted that the Native Americans 
owned Newark by virtue of their original possession and improvement, and that the 
current occupiers’ ancestors had peacefully purchased this property.”). 
 326 7 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 324, at 36 (emphasis added). 
 327 In 1750, a petition to King George II was signed by over four hundred Newark 
settlers who “invoked natural law to protect property won by possession and im-
provement.”  MCCONVILLE, supra note 211, at 171.  On June 1, 1750, the Board of 
Trade, headed by its president, George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax, issued a re-
port to “The Right Honorable the Lords of His Majesty’s Most Honorable Privy 
Council” which stated, with respect to the Province of New Jersey: 
     This Country was first discover’d by Subjects of England whereby the 
Right to the Soil and Government thereof was vested in the Crown of 
England . . . . 
     . . .  
     . . . [A] great Number of Persons, chiefly the dregs of the People, 
and many of them Irish, some of which had seated themselves upon 
Lands under pretence of Purchases from the Indians . . . [began] deny-
ing His Majesty’s Right to the Soil or Government of America, and 
insinuating that the Royal Grants thereof were void and fraudulent. 
7 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 324, at 467, 469–70.  No definitive 
action, however, was taken by English authorities, or by the courts of New Jersey, and 
the matter was eventually mooted by the American Revolution. 
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acquired territory in the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys.328  Central to 
this struggle for control of the trans-Appalachian west was the issue of 
native land rights.  The shareholders of the combined Illinois and 
Wabash Land Company were not alone in contending that private 
individuals could directly acquire native lands.  Puritan Roger Wil-
liams, Jesuit Thomas Copley, and Quaker Thomas Chalkley had 
insisted upon the primacy of Indian title.  The Newark settlers, for 
perhaps more worldly reasons, also championed and relied upon In-
dian deeds. 
It is evident that John Marshall’s unyielding pronouncement in 
Johnson v. McIntosh, that Indian tribes are “incapable of transferring 
the absolute title to others,”329 was by no means universally accepted 
prior to the Supreme Court’s pivotal 1823 decision.  Marshall’s legal 
views were not shared by the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians, the na-
tive grantors who in 1773 and 1775 sold most of their lands to the 
individuals comprising the Illinois and Wabash Land Companies.  
Nor should John Marshall’s views on the diminished nature of Indian 
land rights be accepted today. 
 328 See generally THOMAS PERKINS ABERNATHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1959); SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR 
INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT (1968); ONUF, supra note 296. 
 329 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823). 
